The Practical Failure of German Export Control Law: A Lesson in Modern Trade by Corcoran, Daniel D.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 1 1992 Article 6
The Practical Failure of German Export
Control Law: A Lesson in Modern Trade
Daniel D. Corcoran∗
∗
Copyright c©1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Practical Failure of German Export
Control Law: A Lesson in Modern Trade
Daniel D. Corcoran
Abstract
This Comment will argue that the process of controlling exports must change fundamentally
if the foreign policy and security objectives of export controls are to be met. Part I will examine
the existing international obligations of exporting nations, such as the FRG, highlighting current
public international law. Part I will also analyze the structure of the relevant German legislation.
Part II will discuss the practical failure of German export controls. Additionally, Part II will re-
view the subsequent reform legislation. Part III will argue that restructuring of the current national
controls is necessary. The national measures should control either categorically or completely, and
a comprehensive international network of enforcement should supplement these controls. Finally,
Part III will also address the practical implications of these options. This Comment concludes that
national export controls should change structurally and that a more comprehensive approach to
international coordination and enforcement should be adopted as the model. This Comment will
argue that the process of controlling exports must change fundamentally if the foreign policy and
security objectives of export controls are to be met. Part I will examine the existing international
obligations of exporting nations, such as the FRG, highlighting current public international law.
Part I will also analyze the structure of the relevant German legislation. Part II will discuss the
practical failure of German export controls. Additionally, Part II will review the subsequent reform
legislation. Part III will argue that restructuring of the current national controls is necessary. The
national measures should control either categorically or completely, and a comprehensive interna-
tional network of enforcement should supplement these controls. Finally, Part III will also address
the practical implications of these options. This Comment concludes that national export controls
should change structurally and that a more comprehensive approach to international coordination
and enforcement should be adopted as the model.
THE PRACTICAL FAILURE OF GERMAN EXPORT
CONTROL LAW: A LESSON IN MODERN
TRADE*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, numerous German firms have sold
chemical and biological weapons products and technology, as
well as advanced nuclear-destruction expertise to Third World
countries including India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and South Af-
rica.' The transactions ranged from illegal exports to exports
of questionable legality due to lax controls and legal loop-
holes.2 The series of dubious German transfers raises funda-
mental questions about the efficacy and legitimacy of tradi-
tional export controls and their national and international im-
plementation and enforcement structures.- The Federal
Republic of Germany's ("FRG") bureaucratic system of export
controls has been largely unsuccessful in preventing the trans-
* The 1991 Marks & Murase International Law Fellowship generously funded
the research for this Comment at the Free University of Berlin. The author would
like to thank Christoph Lange, Esq. of Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green,
Professor Detlef Leenen of the Free University of Berlin, and Dr. Michael P. Malloy
of Fordham University School of Law for their efforts on his behalf.
1. See, e.g., Hans 0. Eglau, Mit einem Bein im Gefidngis; Unklare Bestimmungen,
fragwtirdige Geschtifte: Riistungsexport im Zwielicht, DIE ZEIT, Sept. 2, 1983, at 21; Frauke
Hartmann, Wolfgang Hoffmann & Kuno Kruse, Deutsche Waffenffir die Welt; Mit vielen
einfachen Tricks kb'nnen deutsche Rtistungs-Exporteure die ohnehin schwammigen Kontrollbestim-
mungen umgehen, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 3, 1989, at 11; Wolfgang Hoffmann, Affire um Agni:
Die neue indische Atomrakete sol mit deutscher Hilfe entstanden sein, DIE ZEIT, Aug. 4, 1989,
at 18; Wolfgang Hoffmann, Alles ohne Kontrolle; Bonn macht illegale Waffenexporte zu leicht,
DIE ZEIT, Jan. 13, 1989, at 17 [hereinafter Hoffmann, Ales ohne Kontrolle]; Wolfgang
Hoffmann, Die groBe Heuchelei; Trotz Hinweise auf illegale Ausfuhren blieben die zustdndigen
Stellen lange untditig, DIE ZEIT, Jan. 25, 1991, at 31; Wolfgang Hoffmann, Ein Schub aus
dem Hinterhalt; Ftir den Export deutscher Waffenteile gibt es kaum noch Beschriinkungen, DIE
ZEIT, Nov. 18, 1983, at 33; Hannes Krill, Rohlingejeden Kalibers; Der Fall einer Coburger
Firma zeigt, wie dtirftig die Kontrollen fir Exporte in den Irak waren, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,
Feb. 22, 1991, at 3; Hannes Krill, Saddam Husseins deutsche Geschiftspartner, DIE WELT,
Feb. 11, 1991, at 6; Albrecht Miuller, Damit die deutschen Waffen ausschliel3lich im Bindnis
bleiben; Warum die Sozialdemokraten ein Verbot von Rtistungsexporten auBerhalb der Nato for-
dern, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Jan. 31, 1991, at 39; Herbert Wulf, Was nicht schiegt
und knallt ist keine Waffe, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Feb. 10, 1987, at 12; see also Pete
Stark, Stopping Saddam's Bomb, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1990, at 18.
2. See, e.g., Alles ohne Kontrolle, supra note 1.
3. Cf. HOMER E. MOYER, JR. & LINDA A. MABRY, EXPORT CONTROLS As INSTRU-
MENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 169 (1988) ("The lessons we most need to learn about
export controls are lessons about their limits.., we have overused export controls as
policy tools, frequently with unrealistic expectations of their potential impact.").
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fer of dangerous technologies and goods to developing coun-
tries.4
The FRG attempted to reform its export controls only af-
ter extensive negative publicity and considerable pressure
from the international community.5 To counter the continuing
illegal and questionable transfers, the German parliament
("Bundestag") eventually responded with reform legislation.6
Each of these measures, however, has proven largely cosmetic,
as sensitive materials have continued to cross FRG borders.7
The limited success in controlling exports is, in part, a result of
4. See HOLGER KOPPE & EGMONT R. KOCH, BOMBEN-GESCH.FTE: TODLICHE WAF-
FEN FOR DIE DRITrE WELT (1990); HANS LEYENDECKER & RICHARD RICKELMANN, Ex-
PORTEURE DES TODES: DEUTSCHER RUSTUNGSSKANDAL IN NAHOST (4th ed. 1991);
JURGEN ROTH, DIE ILLEGALEN DEUTSCHEN WAFFENGESCHAFTE UND IHRE INTERNATION-
ALEN VERFLECHTUNGEN (1988); see also KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN, THE DEATH LOBBY:
How THE WEST ARMED IRAQ (1991) [hereinafter THE DEATH LOBBY]. For parliamen-
tary activity and debate regarding the controversy of German export controls, see,
e.g., BUNDESTAG PROTOKOLLE [parliamentary transcripts] [BT-PR.] 10/165, at 12331-
36; 11/10, at 590-601; 11/233, at 18581-83; 11/ 118, at 18603-05, 18619-30; and
BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE [parliamentary printed matter] [BT-DR.] 11/4843; 11/
7179; 11/8384; 11/4519; 11/7183; 12/60 (neu); 11/3854.
5. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Marc Fisher, German Firms Primed Iraq's War Machine,
WASH. POST, July 23, 1992, at Al; see also Hermann Bachmaier, Der Skandal mit der
Exportkontrolle, in KOPPE & KOCH, supra note 4, at 9. Commentators have charged that
the Bundesregierung ("Federal Government") has had longstanding knowledge of
the problems with export controls and did not attempt substantive remedies. See id.
Hermann Bachmaier, member of the German parliament ("Bundestag") and chair of
its Atomic Research Committee, reports that "[m]uch of the [German] deadly busi-
ness was able to develop undisturbed, because the government of Bonn and its civil
servants were satisfied with playing the role of spectators although the Americans
and British intelligence provided information." Id. (translation by Comment au-
thor); see Das Recht aufdie Bombe, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 18, 1991, at 23; Richard Donkin
et al., A Country That Turned A Blind Eye, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, at 20.
6. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR WIRTSCHAFT, BERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG
OBER DIE VERSCHARFUNG DER KONTROLLE DES EXPORTS VON ZIVIL UND MILIT.RISCH
VERWENDBAREN GU TERN (1992) [hereinafter BMWI 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF Ex-
PORT CONTROLS]; BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR WIRTSCHAFT, DIE REFORM VON
AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSRECHT UND -KONTROLLE (1991) [hereinafter BMWI 1991 REPORT
ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS]; see also HOCKE/BERWALD/MAURER AUBENWIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT: GESETZE, VERORDNUNGEN, ERLASSE MIT KOMMENTAR Hauptteil I,
Wortlaut der Anderungsgesetze zum AWG, and Hauptteil II, Wortlaut der letzten
Anderungsverordnungen zur AWV (Siegfried Berwald et al. eds., June 1992) [herein-
after HOCKE COMMENTARY].
7. See Donkin et al., supra note 5, at 20. The most dramatic example is the outfit-
ting of Iraq during a U.N. embargo. Id.; Saddams Legion, DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 21, 1991,
at 3 1;see S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. and Dec. Supp., at 19, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., Res. and Dec. Supp., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
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an approach that is technologically8 and politically9 outdated
1325 (1990) [hereinafter Iraq Embargo]. An estimated 110 German companies were
suspected of attempted violation of the AWG. Donkin et al., supra note 5, at 20.
The Iraq Embargo was implemented nationally under NEUNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR
ANDERUNG DER AU ENWIRTSCHAF'rSVERORDNUNG, 1990 Bundesanzeiger [BAnz.] 4013
(F.R.G.) (sharpening transfer controls against Iraq and occupied Kuwait, and freez-
ing of all accounts, deposits, and other property belonging to occupied Kuwait);
ZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSVERORDNUNG, 1990
BAnz. 4065 (F.R.G.) (forbidding legal business and trade violating Iraq Embargo);
DREIZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSVERORDNUNG, 1990
BAnz. 6757 (F.R.G.) (refining controls further to include activities in addition to Iraq
Embargo); and VIERZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AUBENWIRTSCHAF-
SVERORDNUNG, 1991 BAnz. 1725 (F.R.G.) (sharpening of foreign trade restrictions
with certain countries; requiring authorization for dual-use goods, which can also be
used for military purposes if exporter has "knowledge" of intended military appro-
priation; and requiring authorization for services on military projects in these desig-
nated countries). For a discussion of these revisions, see Peter L6ffler, Zur straflichen
Bewdltigung von Verstol3en gegen das Irak Embargo, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFT
STEUER STRAFRECHT 121, 122 (1991).
8. See infra notes 269-84 and accompanying text (explaining difficulty in control-
ling modem technology transfers).
9. See PANEL ON THE FUTURE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. NATIONAL SE-
CURITY EXPORT CONTROLS & COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY, FINDING COMMON GROUND: U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVI-
RONMENT 39 (1991) [hereinafter FINDING COMMON GROUND]. The international polit-
ical dynamic has changed drastically since the conception of German export controls.
See id. The security concerns that shaped modern export controls have been in-
verted. See id. For example, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports
("CoCom") has recently called for a relaxation of export controls. See Keith Brad-
sher, U.S. and Allies Ease Sales to Former Soviet Republics, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at
Dl8 (reporting loosening of CoCom controls and CoCom's intention to invite for-
mer Soviet Republics to join its members in forum to discuss cooperation on export
controls); see also Keith Bradsher, Bush Eases Cold-War Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1992, at D l (reporting that as national security threat of cold war diminishes, export
controls will be loosened on supercomputers, although some arms experts contend
that other threats exist as exemplified by arming of Iraq); Keith Bradsher, Export
Curbs Will Ease, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1992, at DI (reporting that U.S.
Commerce Department would pursue export promotion policy and loosen controls
on 11 products including computer chips, eventually increasing American exports by
US $3,000,000,000 per .year). In fact, "[tihe multilateral control framework embod-
ied in CoCom is an artifact of the Cold War-which is over." FINDING COMMON
GROUND, supra, at 39.
Moreover, the former Soviets are now selling some of their most sensitive tech-
nology to the West. WilliamJ. Broad, U.S. Is Shopping as Soviets Offer To Sell Once-Secret
Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991, at Al. More than ever, policy formulation at-
tempts to address the competing needs of facilitating the movement of goods to en-
hance trade and of restricting the transborder movement of goods capable of being
deployed militarily. See Oliver Remien, Aussenwirtschaftsrecht in Kollisionsrechtlicher Sicht
zur internationalen Reichweite von Aus- und Einfuhrverboten, 54 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 431, 432 (1990).
As an academic matter, the theoretical underpinnings of these controls are likely
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and difficult in practice to enforce.' 0
This Comment will argue that the process of controlling
exports must change fundamentally if the foreign policy and
security objectives of export controls are to be met. Part I will
examine the existing international obligations of exporting na-
tions, such as the FRG, highlighting current public interna-
tional law. Part I will also analyze the structure of the relevant
German legislation. Part II will discuss the practical failure of
German export controls. Additionally, Part II will review the
subsequent reform legislation. Part III will argue that restruc-
the maintenance of spheres of economic and political predominance. These precepts
are implicitly expressed in policy statements concerning the controls. There is inter-
esting scholarship, however, portending the inherent mortality of such premises, i.e.,
that the global power dynamic is likely to shift. Compare GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY U. Sibree trans., Dover Publications 1956)
(1830-31) (conceptualizing dialectic that history moves in logical fashion as God's or
Absolute's intention and purpose move from state to state in recurring pattern of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) with PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000
(1987) (dealing with possible political repercussions of loss of economic-technologi-
cal competitiveness of United States and decline as world power).
10. See, e.g., DerApparat macht was er will, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 4, 1991, at 30. Many
players and factors are involved in the practice of export. Reportedly, the industrial
lobby has great influence over German export legislation and licensing. See Michael
Brzoska, Legen markige Sprtiche des Todes das Handwerk?, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU,
Mar. 9, 1991, at 14. Additionally, the private political agenda of the
Bundesnachrichtendienst ("Federal Secret Service" or "BND") appears at odds with
official policies. See Der Apparat maht was er will, supra, at 30. Most recently, the BND
attempted to ship Soviet-made military hardware to Israel, despite the express prohi-
bition of the Bundessicherheitsrat ("National Security Ministry"). Id.
Moreover, throughout the Western world, the political resolve to truly prevent
these transfers is suspect. See James Adams, The Real Lesson of the Gulf War, ATLANTIC,
Nov. 1991, at 36. Policy statements can be deceptive. For example, the Bush admin-
istration has announced its stand against the proliferation of "weapons of mass de-
struction"; however, "with modern weapons the distinction between conventional
and unconventional warfare has been blurred." Id. Some Western countries en-
courage the sale of high technology weapons, such as lasers, microcomputers, and
Stealth systems, to developing countries to reduce unit costs of production. Id. Cf.
Seymour M. Hersh, U.S. Is Said to Have Let Israel Sell Arms to Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1991, at 1 (reporting that Reagan Administration approved Israeli sale of "American-
made arms, spare parts and ammunition to the Iranian government" despite official
pronouncements of "Operation Staunch, to stop worldwide transfers of military
goods to Iran"); Elaine Sciolino, Iraq Policy Still Bedevils Bush as Congress Asks: Were
Crimes Committed?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at 18 (reporting that U.S. government
may have illegally permitted sale of sophisticated American technology and equip-
ment to Iraq in order to improve relations and including charges that U.S. Com-
merce Department may have falsified lists of exports to Iraq and that U.S. money may
have been diverted to pay for Iraqi arms).
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turing of the current national controls is necessary. The na-
tional measures should control either categorically or com-
pletely, and a comprehensive international network of enforce-
ment should supplement these controls. Finally, Part III will
also address the practical implications of these options. This
Comment concludes that national export controls should
change structurally and that a more comprehensive approach
to international coordination and enforcement should be
adopted as the model.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF EXPORT
CONTROL AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FRG
A. International Systems Set Limited Norms on Export Control
The traditions of public international law guide the cur-
rent set of international legal controls on exports."' Public in-
ternational law typically attempts to order varied national in-
terests within a workable legal system.12 Conceptually, inter-
national law assumes a global interest in governing sovereigns'
interactions as they pursue individual and shared goals.'1 It is
an accepted social contract that ultimately operates to the ben-
efit of its participants. 14 The creation of an international legal
order is a normative order' 5 both defining mutually acceptable
behavior and prescribing procedure.'"
11. Cf. Oscar Schachter, The Role of International Law in Maintaining Peace, in AP-
PROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP 65, 68 (W. Scott Thompson & Kenneth
M. Jensen eds., 1991) ("Virtually every sector of political, social and economic activ-
ity has become subject, in some measure, to international rules and procedures.")
(citations omitted).
12. See id. at 67.
13. See id.
14. See id. ("Because the [international legal] system was not imposed by a supe-
rior authority, it is often viewed as basically contractual and consensual in character
* . . no state has, or has had, an option to remain outside the international legal
system, and, indeed, no state has professed to do so."); see also GRUNDGESETZ [Con-
stitution] [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.). This article of the FRG constitution, in its entirety,
states that
[t]he general rules of public international law shall be an integral part of
federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly cre-
ate rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.
Id., translated in PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE
BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 24 (1986) [hereinafter BASIC LAW
OF THE FRG].
15. See Schachter, supra note 11, at 67.
16. See id. This normative order, however, does not prevent a nation from pro-
1992-1993] 203
204 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:199
In the attempt to achieve world peace, the international
policy approach has long been, arguably, focused on the dated
issue of traditional East-West arms control regulation, leaving
some equally important threats insufficiently regulated.' 7 In
the context of export controls, policy and approach appear
fragmented and acceptable norms less carefully defined and
regulated. Currently, a patchwork of limited multilateral sys-
tems guides German export policy. International legal coordi-
nation of export controls presupposes that the national legisla-
tive machinery will operate in synchromesh, collectively
preventing dangerous exports to nonaligned countries.' 8 The
German export controls in question represent the national
machinations within larger international systems.' 9
tecting itself in the event of impending military or economic threat. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 51 (providing member states with right of self-defense); General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 19, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 212 [hereinafter GATT] (allowing contracting parties to protect their
domestic economies where threat of material injury to established industry or where
threat of materially retarding establishment of domestic industry).
17. See Edward C. Luck, Interstate Organizations: Current Scholarship, Analysis, and
Practice, in APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP 173, 179 (W. Scott
Thompson & Kenneth M. Jensen eds., 1991); David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag,
Carrying A Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament And Development Assistance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 993, 1058 (1991). Until recently, the East-West dynamic has domi-
nated the international political consciousness.
[F]or a generation, security leaders have taught us to think that the principal
functions of national defense expenditures are to deter bilateral nuclear war
.... We need now to shift to a more complicated, sophisticated understand-
ing that the dangers of the modern world come in all sorts of forms and
from diverse locations ... we are now compelled to adopt very different.
strategies and policies to support it.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. See MOYER & MABRY, supra note 3, at 158-61 (defining purposes of using
controls on multilateral basis only); BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 10 (stating that only when all important exporting countries
apply similar control standards can reform of German export controls reach its goal
of preventing transfer of dangerous exports to unstable regions of world); cf. ROBERT
0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY 98 (1984) (stating that "[d]ecentralized enforcement of regime rules
... is neither swift nor certain").
19. Cf. KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 98 ("International regimes are decentralized
institutions .. .[which] mean[s] that any sanctions for violation of regime principles
or rules have to be enacted by the individual members .... ).
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1. The Primary International Organization Concerned with
the Export Controls of Industrialized Nations
Export controls are designed to deal with both interna-
tional and domestic concerns in exports. 20 The international
concerns about dangerous exports are largely shared by the
FRG's allies, and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Exports ("CoCom"), as a body, primarily addresses these con-
cerns. 21 At the initiative of the United States, this intergovern-
mental group was formed during the cold war to coordinate
embargo politics, in which its primary function was to limit the
export of strategically relevant goods to communist coun-
tries. 2 To accomplish this function, CoCom establishes a list
of embargo goods,"2 and CoCom consistently revises its list to
conform to technological advances and particular political con-
cerns. 24 The members of CoCom collectively construct these
resolutions, and enforce the controls independently; however,
CoCom has no binding authority.25 Additionally, CoCom's
recommendations are officially secret.26
2. The International Coordination of Certain Categorical
Exports
In addition to participation in CoCom, the FRG is a party
to other various international' agreements and structures
designed to limit certain categories of exports of deadly know-
how and wares. 27 Each of these agreements has a discrete con-
trol function. The most prominent weapons-technology con-
20. See, e.g., MOYER & MABRY, supra note 3, at 2-3, 119, 156-57.
21. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 274-76
(1990); see also HOCKE COMMENTARY, supra note 6, Hauptteil II, § 5 AWV Anm., at 1-
4, § 17 AWV Anm., at 2, § 29b AWV Anm., at 1; ADELHEID PuTrLER, V6LKERRECH-
TLICHE GRENZEN VON EXPORT- UND REEXPORTVERBOTEN 40-41 (1989).
22. See ELMAR M. HUCKO, AUBENWIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 13 (2d ed. 1990); MALLOY,
supra note 21, at 274.
23. See MALLOY, supra note 21, at 275.
24. See id. at 276.
25. See id. at 274-75. The current members of CoCom are Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at
274 n.7 (citing 15 C.F.R. § 770.2).
26. See id.
27. For a current discussion of these multilateral control regimes and others, see
Peter Rudolf, Non-Proliferation and International Export Controls, 42 AUSSENPOLrrIK 390,
393-99 (Eng. ed. 1991).
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trol arrangements in this area include the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"),2 8 the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime ("MTCR"), 9 and the Australia Group.3 °
The NPT is an attempt to limit the circle of nations pos-
sessing nuclear weapons capabilities.3 ' Under the NPT, non-
nuclear weapons states3 2 agreed not to import or produce nu-
clear-explosive products. 33 The nuclear-capable states agreed
not to transfer nuclear weapons technology or to participate in
its development with other states. 34 The International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA"), a U.N.-sponsored organization, ad-
ministers verification of the terms of the NPT 5 Under the
NPT, nuclear-capable states agreed to support the develop-
ment of nuclear power plants as energy sources in non-nuclear
states.36 The IAEA is responsible for inspection to assure that
signatories do not divert nuclear technology and facilities from
civilian use to military application. 7 To accomplish this goal,
the IAEA conducts on-site inspections of nuclear facilities.38
The NPT, however, does not require any IAEA safeguards of
its member nuclear-capable states. The safeguards in place are
mainly informational ones, providing for record-keeping of lo-
cation, quantities, form, and movement of nuclear materials. 39
As a corollary to the NPT, but outside of the IAEA framework,
28. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
29. Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology
Related to Missiles, Apr. 16, 1987 [hereinafter MTCR], reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 599
(1987).
30. See Raymond Cohen, The Proposed Solution, in Is IT FEASIBLE TO NEGOTIATE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL? 19, 20 (Kenneth M. Jensen & David
Wurmser eds., 1990). The Australia Group is an informal association that meets pe-
riodically to exchange information on the spread of chemical weapons products and
technology. Id.
31. NPT, supra note 28, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 485-86, 729 U.N.T.S. at 170-71,
173.
32. NPT, supra note 28, art. IX, § 3, 21 U.S.T. at 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174-
75.
33. NPT, supra note 28, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
34. NPT, supra note 28, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
35. NPT, supra note 28, art. III, § 4, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency created the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") on October 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
36. NPT, supra note 28, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
37. NPT, supra note 28, art. III, § 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
38. Id.
39. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 393-99.
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seven major nuclear-capable countries interested in strength-
ening their national nuclear-export policies formed the Nu-
clear Suppliers Group.4"
Seven industrialized nations formed the MTCR to enact
similar national controls to regulate the export of nuclear-ca-
pable missile systems and technologies.4 ' The MTCR applies
to missile systems with payload capacities of 500 kilograms and
a reach of 300 kilometers.4 2 As the MTCR has no coordinating
body, the implementation of controls is left to individual mem-
ber states.43 The specific rules of the MTCR have been subject
to interpretative differences.44
Following the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, ten industrial-
ized countries founded the Australia Group to address the ex-
port control issues of chemical weapons in the absence of an
international treaty totally banning the use of chemical weap-
ons.4 5 In an attempt to contain the proliferation of chemical
40. See, e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group: Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, Feb.
1978, I.A.E.A. Doc. INFCIRC/254, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 220 (1978); see also Rudolf,
supra note 27, at 394. The founding members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
("NSG") were the United States, the Soviet Union, the FRG, the United Kingdom,
France, Canada, and Japan. Id. The NSG, initially formed after India exploded its
first nuclear bomb, reconvened after the Persian Gulf war to reassess the changed
needs of international control of nuclear technology. William J. Broad, 27 Countries
Sign New Atom Accord, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at 15. A group of 27 nations signed
an accord detailing international rules to limit the sale of machines and materials
used in civilian and military nuclear products. Id. The accord, however, does not
include such suppliers as China, Brazil, or Argentina. Id. "The accord is voluntary
and has no enforcement mechanism other than the' pressure of participating states,
which have a common interest in maintaining a level playing field among high-tech
exporters around the world." Id.
41. MTCR, supra note 29, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 599-601; see Rudolf, supra note
27, at 396. Canada, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States founded the MTCR in 1987. Id. Australia, Austria, the Benelux coun-
tries, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, and Spain subsequently joined the MTCR.
Id.; see also Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1056 n.252.
42. MTCR, supra note 29, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 601; see Rudolf, supra note 27,
at 396. The threshold of 500 kilograms corresponds to the mass of a simple nuclear
missile and the range of 300 kilometers allows "friendly states to acquire land-based
tactical systems, air-to-air missiles or air defence systems." Id. at 397 n. 17.
43. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 397. The MTCR distinguishes between com-
plete systems and their components, which may have both military and civilian uses.
MTCR, supra note 29, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 601-02; see Rudolf, supra note 27, at
397. Control of the components is left to the discretion of the member states. Id.
The variety of applications of the involved technologies has caused problems, partic-
ularly because they are similar to those used in civilian aircraft. Id. at 397-98.
44. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 397-98.
45. See id. at 395. The Australia Group now consists of 20 countries, including
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weapons, the Australia Group established a "warning list" of
fifty chemicals that are susceptible to both military and civilian
uses.4 6 The FRG was one of the few member states to require
official approval for the export of any of the fifty chemicals.4 7
In future meetings, the Australia Group also intends to focus
its attention on the non-proliferation of biological weapons. 48
B. The FRG Implements Its Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy
Through National Foreign Trade Law
1. FRG Foreign Trade Law: The Foreign Trade Act and the
Imposition of Trade Restrictions
German administration of the continually refined system
of export controls is not unlike its international counterparts. 49
In fact, the German legislative design is relatively extensive
and sophisticated compared to international standards. 50 The
FRG statutory framework theoretically facilitates revision to
adapt to sensitive political events.5 ' It controls the obvious
categories of exports with its express prohibitions,52 and it has
the authority to control ambiguous exports through its licens-
ing scheme.53 The AuBenwirtschaftsgesetz ("Foreign Trade
Act" or "AWG") of the FRG is the governing structure for
Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and the United States. Id. ; see Paul Lewis, Chemical-Arms Ban Written; Fast
Action Asked, N.Y. TiMEs,June 25, 1992, at All; Cohen, supra note 30, at 20-21 (pro-
posing establishment of formal central body to deal with controlling exports of
chemical weapons technology and products).
46. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 395. A core list of nine chemicals were to be
subject to export restrictions in all member states. Members are to notify their do-
mestic industries of the list and businesses are to refrain from transactions involving
the chemical weapons programs of Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. Id.
47. Id. After the Persian Gulf war, the member states agreed to make arrange-
ments to subject all 50 chemicals to export controls for transfer outside of the Aus-
tralia Group. Id.
48. Id. at 396.
49. See, e.g., Remien, supra note 9 (comparing and distinguishing export control
systems of Germany, Austria, and United States, among others).
50. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 5 (quoting president of Germany's Federal
Export Control -Office).
51. See, e.g., EINUNDZWANZIGSTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1992
BAnz. 3277 (F.R.G.) (implementing embargo against Libya as provided by U.N. Se-
curity Council Resolution No. 748 of Apr. 15, 1992).
52. See AUBENWIRTSCHAFrSGESETZ [AWG] § 7, 2 (F.R.G.).
53. AWG § 3.
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German export control54 and, likewise, establishes the bases
for strengthening these controls.5 5 For example, in the FRG,
the Foreign Trade Act incorporates CoCom positions on ex-
port and technology-transfer limitations56 into an appendix
("Ausfuhrliste" or "Export List"). 7 The statute, however,
only defines a framework by providing for general guidelines
for the range of German foreign trade.58 As a primary con-
cern, the Foreign Trade Act framework supports the single
principle of liberalized trade and commerce. 59
Under this legislative rubric, the Bundestag implements
the specific provisions of export control in the form of Rechts
verordnungen ("Legal Regulations"). 60 . The coordinate oper-
ational legislation of the Foreign Trade Act is the AuBenwirt-
schaftsverordnung ("Foreign Trade Regulation" or "AWV").1t
54. AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSGESETZ [AWG], 1961 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I]
481 (F.R.G.). "With the end of the occupation on May 5, 1955, the sovereignty of
the FRG in the field of foreign exchange was established. On December 29, 1958 the
free convertibility of the German currency, the Deutsche Mark, was finally declared."
ULF R. SIEBEL, FOREIGN TRADE LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 15
(1989). The AWG was introduced as a bill on October 15, 1959 and debated by a
committee of experts in 16 meetings. The AWG was promulgated on April 28, 1961.
See id. at 15-16; see also PUTTLER, supra note 21, at 28; Remien, supra note 9, at 440-41.
55. See PUTrLER, supra note 21, at 27.
56. AWG § 7; see BUNDESAMT FUR WIRTSCHAFF, DIE AUSFUHR VON EM-
BARGOWAREN 13-14 (3d ed. Nov. 1991); KLAUS W. EBERT, RECHTUCHE
BESCHRANKUNGEN DES TECHNOLOGIE TRANSFERS IM AUBENWIRTSCHAFrSVERKEHR 1 I 1-
27 (1986); HOCKE COMMENTARY, supra note 6, Hauptteil II, § 17 AWV Anm., at 2-3;
ECKART PUTZIER, DIE ERMACHTIGUNGEN DES AUBENWIRTSCHAFTSGESETZES 62-63
(1987); Remien, supra note 9, at 443.
57. ANLAGE AL ZUR AUf3ENWIRTSCHAF-rSVERORDNUNG [Ausfuhrliste or Export
List]; see J6RG F. F. VON FURSTENWERTH, ERMESSENSENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM AUBENWIRT-
SCHAFrSRECHT 50-51 (1985).
58. See HOCKE COMMENTARY, supra note 6, Vorbem. § 2 AWG; HUCKO, supra note
22, at 10; SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 15; VON FURSTENWERTH, supra note 57, at 46.
Restrictions in foreign trade are instituted pursuant to AWG § 21, 1 through imple-
menting ordinances. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 15.
59. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 12, 30. "In principle, trade and commerce in
goods and services, and capital payments as well as other business transactions with
Foreign Economic Areas [outside the FRG] are free ...." AWG § 1, translated in
SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 30. This legislation ushered the FRG into the international
free market system from the sheltered post-war economy. See BT-DR. 3/1285, at
230, 233; see also SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 15-16; VON FURSTENWERTH, supra note 57,
at 45; Remien, supra note 9, at 442-43.
60. AWG § 27.
61. AUBENWIRTSCHAFrVERORDNUNG [AWV], 1986 BGBI. I 2671 (F.R.G.) [origi-
nally AWV, 1961 BGB1. 1 1381 (F.R.G.)]. The AWV implements the AWG. Before
1986, the AWV was developed through 59 amendments and revisions. It was, there-
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This tiered approach provides legislative flexibility in allowing
for efficient response to changing economic and political cir-
cumstances through the Foreign Trade Regulation. 62 This leg-
islative process is facilitated through the use of amendments
and revisions. 6' The concept of freedom inherent in the For-
eign Trade Act is immutable and can not be negated by subse-
quent amendments. 64 The Foreign Trade Act, nonetheless, al-
lows for limitations on exports for foreign policy and security
reasons 65
Although the Foreign Trade Act establishes the right to
the greatest possible freedom of action in international trans-
fore, reintroduced on December 18, 1986 and implemented on January 1, 1987, re-
placing the original. It continues to be revised. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 15.
62. AWG § 27. The official basis for AWG § 27 [formerly AWG § 26] was that
the economy was dependent on external political factors and needed to be able to
adjust accordingly: "Rechtsverdordnungen aufgrund des AuBenwirtschaftsgesetzes
k6nnen von erheblicher Bedeutung far die gesamte Volkswirtschaft sein. Sie haben
aulberdem oftmals Auswirkungen in anderen, insbesondere politischen Bereichen."
BT-DR. 3/1285, at 250; see VON FURSTENWERTH, supra note 57, at 50 (enumerating
international political crises that effects domestic economy).
63. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 15. The AuBenwirtschaftsverordnung has been
revised 16 times from 1986-1991. The revisions include AWV, 1986 BGBI. I 2671
(F.R.G.); ERSTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1987 BGBI. I 2626 (F.R.G.);
ZWEITE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1989 BGBI. I 341 (F.R.G.); DRrrrE
VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1989 BGBI. I 535 (F.R.G.); VIERTE VER-
ORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1989 BGBI. I 1134 (F.R.G.); FONFrE VER-
ORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1989 BGBI. I 1749 (F.R.G.); SECHSTE VER-
ORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1990 BGBI. I 554 (F.R.G.); SIEBTE VERORDNUNG
ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1990 BGBI. I 1121 (F.R.G.); AcHTE VERORDNUNG ZUR
kNDERUNG DER AWV, 1990 BGBI. I 1510 (F.R.G.); NEUNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR
ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1990 BAnz. 4013 (F.R.G.); ZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR
ANDERUNG DER AWV, 1990 BAnz. 4065 (F.R.G.); ELITE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG
DER AWV, 1990 BAnz. 5261 (F.R.G.); ZW6LFrE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER
AWV, 1990 BAnz. 6637 (F.R.G.); DREIZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER
AWV, 1990 BAnz. 6757 (F.R.G.); VIERZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER
AWV, 1991 BAnz. 1725 (F.R.G.); FUNFZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER
AWV, 1991 BAnz. 2069 (F.R.G.); SECHZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER
AWV, 1991 BAnz. 4741 (F.R.G.).
64. BT-DR. 3/1285, at 231; see HOCKE COMMENTARY, supra note 6, Hauptteil I,
§ 1 AWG Anm., at 1-2. The Federal Administrative Court of the FRG stated that
[t]he power given to the administration to introduce restrictions must be
limited and precise in such a way that it can be predicted in which cases and
for which aim and purpose such power will be made use of and which con-
tent the measures decreed on the strength of such power conferred will
have.
SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 26.
65. AWG §§ 5, 7; see PurrLER, supra note 21, at 28; see also Remien, supra note 9,
at 443.
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actions,6" it also provides the capacity to restrict trade.67 Any
limitation on the freedom accorded international transactions,
however, must be specifically prescribed by law68 and kept to
an absolute minimum. 69 Accordingly, exemptions to export
restrictions should be liberally administered. °
The Bundestag, however, generally has authority to im-
pose certain limitations and restrictions on foreign trade in two
circumstances. First, the power to restrict exports arises in the
maintenance of the orderly development of the domestic econ-
omy, 7 1 and, second, the power arises in the prevention of the
disruption of countries' peaceful relations. 72 Limitations or re-
strictions on the transfers of dangerous technologies fall se-
curely under the latter category.73
66. See Remien, supra note 9, at 446 (defining "international transactions" as
transactions between FRG residents and non-residents or regarding foreign assets).
67. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 30. In contrast, in the United States export is a
privilege and not a right. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 64 (1988).
68. AWG §§ 1-3.
69. AWG § 2, 2-3. The relevant portion thereof states that
[r]estrictions are to be limited as to character and extent to the minimum
necessary to achieve the purpose stipulated in the empowering legislation.
They are to be formulated in such a way as to interfere as little as possible
with the freedom of economic activity. Restrictions may affect existing con-
tracts only if the purpose to be achieved would otherwise be substantially
jeopardized. Furthermore, restrictions have to be abolished as soon and
insofar as the reasons necessitating their introduction are no longer rele-
vant.
Id., translated in SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 31.
70. AWG § 3, 2. This section states, in part, that
[i]f in accordance with the purpose of the restrictive provision authorisa-
tions can only be given within certain limits then such authorisations should
be granted in such a way that the existing possibilities could best be made
use of under general economic points of view. Preference may be given to
residents who as a consequence of the restrictions particularly suffer in their
normal business activities.
Id., translated in SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 31.
71. See AWG § § 6, 8-24. These must be specific economic reasons, regulated by
AWG §§ 6, 8-24; the purpose is largely to protect the strength of the domestic cur-
rency, the balance of payments, and avert any domestic crises. See EBERT, supra note
56, at 94; PUTZIER, supra note 56, at 64-108.
72. See AWG §§ 5, 7. Primarily political motivations are covered. Id. These
laws allow for the protection of the security and foreign policy interests of the FRG
and allow for the fulfillment of bilateral or multilateral agreements. See EBERT, supra
note 56, at 95; Remien, supra note 9, at 443; PIJTzIER, supra note 56, at 58-63. These
concerns are largely based on constitutional considerations of GG art. 80(I). See PUT-
TLER, supra note 21, at 32-36.
73. See EBERT, supra note 56, at 95. The other set of restriction sections deals
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a. The General Restriction of Exports
The General Restrictions portion of the Foreign Trade
Act 74 protects obligations of the FRG that arise from interna-
tional treaties and supranational organizations.75 In addition,
it protects obligations that arise from German security and for-
eign policy interests. 76 Each of these obligations or interests
implicates the authority to prohibit or interdict military or stra-
tegic exports." In restricting trade, the FRG foreign trade law
expressly distinguishes between specifically prohibited transac-
tions and transactions restricted by the authorization pro-
cess. 78 These restrictions may apply generally or in particular
cases.
79
Furthermore, the legislation categorizes international ar-
rangements8 ° by whether they require domestic promulgation
by the German legislature, or whether they have the force of
law, i.e., enacted by the competent bodies of supranational or-
ganizations to whom the FRG has surrendered certain sover-
eign rights.8 ' Either type of international legislation has
principally with traditional economic trade issues, as opposed to foreign affairs is-
sues. See id. For example, the only general restriction possibility with economic mo-
tives is found in AWG § 6, which establishes standards to protect against foreign ob-
stacles to German trade. See EBERT, supra note 56, at 95. The main purpose of ex-
port control under AWG § 8 is to secure the life-necessity goods of the internal
market in times of crisis when restricting exports would be in the public interest. See
id. at 96. The contractual control in AWG § 9 sets requirements against the dangers
of underpricing in export (i.e., antidumping measures). See id.
74. AWG §§ 5-7; AWV §§ 5-6.
75. AWG § 5.
76. AWG § 7.
77. AWG § 7.
78. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 33.
79. Id.
80. See AWG § 1, 2 (drawing distinction between sources of legislation).
81. See GG art. 24, 1. The article states, in its entirety, that
(1) The Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter-
governmental institutions.
(2) For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of
mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations
upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and
lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation will accede
to agreements concerning international arbitration of a general, compre-
hensive and obligatory nature.
GG art. 24, translated in BASIC LAw OF THE FRG, supra note 14, at 24.
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means of effect under FRG foreign trade law.82 International
treaties, ratified by the Bundestag,8 3 requiring that signatories
take certain measures to restrict transactions, may be imple-
mented through Legal Regulations that enable the FRG to ful-
fill its obligations thereunder.8 4 These measures apply to cases
where a treaty contains an express obligation to enact legisla-
tion, rather than merely allowing for it. 5 Additionally, the
FRG has entered into a great number of bilateral treaties that
contain provisions relating to foreign trade law.8 1f These trea-
ties are typically friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties
that stipulate nondiscriminatory treatment of the residents of
contracting parties,8 7 which the Foreign Trade Act handles
similarly. 8
As an economic matter of national concern, public inter-
national law provides a legal basis for restricting exports do-
mestically.8 9 Under commonly accepted notions of public in-
ternational law, each state has the right to protect its own
82. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 12. Currently, however, the FRG has aggressive
legislation by European Community standards, and German industry is lobbying to
raise European Community requirements to its level. See Marcus Kabel, German In-
dustry Says Tougher Export Rules Hurt Competitiveness, REUTERS, Apr. 9, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; see also BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT
CorROLS, supra note 6, at 10.
83. See GG art. 59, 2. The second paragraph of this article states, in part, that
[tireaties which regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to
matters of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in
the form of a federal law, of the bodies competent in any specific case for
such federal legislation.
Id., translated in BAsic LAw OF THE FRG, supra note 14, at 38.
84. See SIEBEL, Supra note 54, at 20-21, 33-34. However, AWG §§ 1 and 5 do not
cover the case of recommendations issued by different international organizations to
which the FRG is a member, as such recommendations do not have the force of law.
See id. This status also applies to codes and recommendations passed by the United
Nations and its suborganizations. Id.
85. AWG § 5; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 20-21, 33-34. For example, the FRG
could support an embargo as a member state of the United Nations. See PtrrLER,
supra note 21, at 31. AWG § 5 comes into consideration when dealing with human
rights efforts requiring export limitations. For example, the FRG used this construc-
tion to officially support a U.N. embargo of South Africa. See S.C. Res. 418, U.N.
SCOR, 32d Sess., Res. and Dec. Supp., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977), reprinted in
16 I.L.M. 1547, 1548 (1977). This action constituted a weapons embargo against
South Africa under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter. See PUTrLER, supra note 21, at 31.
86. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 23-24.
87. See id.
88. AWG §§ 1, 5.
89. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 34.
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economy.90 Accordingly, the sovereign state has the right to
restrict transactions with residents of other states where it is
necessary to protect its economy.9' In the FRG, the Foreign
Trade Act allows restriction of foreign trade transactions in or-
der to prevent or counteract detrimental effects on the FRG by
foreign systems with different economic orders.92
With a view to political concerns, the Foreign Trade Act
acknowledges the possibility of export restrictions under three
constitutionally-derived precepts:93 first, the preservation of
national security; second, the prevention of disturbing foreign
relations; and third, the preservation of international peace.94
The Foreign Trade Act additionally allows for banning the ex-
port of arms or other war materials, as well as pertinent pat-
ents. 95  Because these restrictions are purely political, it fol-
lows that the discretion involved may be politically moti-
vated.96
b. The Specific Restriction of Exports
Whereas the general restrictions comprise cases of gov-
ernmental obligations,97 the specific restrictions allow the FRG
90. See id. at 23-24. This principle includes the right of retaliation, to counteract
measures taken by another state that would have a damaging effect on the domestic
economy. See id.; see also PuTzIER, supra note 56, at 51-57; Remien, supra note 9, at
434.
91. AWG § 6.
92. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 34.
93. See id. These precepts derive from GG art. 26, 1, which declares unconsti-
tutional any intentional act that could result in a risk to the maintenance of peaceful
community of peoples. Id.
94. AWG § 7, 1. For a discussion of its official use during the Iraq Embargo,
see L6ffler, supra note 7, at 121. Compare BT-DR. 11/7658, at 2 and BT-DR. 11/7694,
at 6. Interestingly, the Rhodesia Embargo led to a discussion of whether such action
could be taken under AWG § 7, 1, as constitutional questions existed. The ques-
tion was presented whether AWG § 7, 1 met the requirements of GG art. 89, 1.
To avoid potential problems, the enabling order was strengthened in connection
with AWG § 2, 1 and § 27, 1, sent. 2. See PuTrLER, supra note 21, at 32.
95. AWG § 7, 2.
96. See EBERT, supra note 56, at 167. The language of AWG § 2, 2 limits the
type and degree of restrictions expressly according to the standards set in AWG §§ 5
and 7. The statutory language deals with the legally discernible standards. Unlike
the restrictions set forth in AWG §§ 6, 8-24, the cases of AWG §§ 5 and 7 are not
primarily concerned with economic protections. See EBERT, supra note 56, at 167.
Formulating export restrictions inevitably involves setting both political and eco-
nomic legal standards, the overlap of which can create problems. Id.
97. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 43-44.
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to restrict particular types of transactions.9" The Foreign
Trade Act divides the specific restrictions into four legal sub-
groups:99 the trading of goods,'0 0 the performance of serv-
ices,' 0 1 capital transactions, 0 2 and gold transactions. 103 Nota-
bly, the same limitations on German exports used to safeguard
the security of the FRG 0 4 may function as specific restrictions
to prevent the possible economic dangers that may arise from
domestic market forces.' 0 5 In practice, three concerns typi-
cally invoke specific restrictions on German export transac-
tions. 10 6 First, in setting specific export restrictions, the For-
eign Trade Act seeks to preserve, as a primary aim, the orderly
flow of the vital supply of goods, in the FRG, or regions of it,
and to prevent the jeopardization thereof.1 7 At stake in this
case is the overall interest in avoiding any economic crisis in
the domestic market. Second, the Foreign Trade Act may also
limit or prohibit the export of agricultural or food products if
they are of inferior quality and such export would negatively
impact on other German exports.10 8 Principally, such meas-
ures are only taken where the FRG perceives negative reper-
cussions to the hallmark "Made in Germany."' 0 9 Last, the For-
eign Trade Act allows for the restriction of the re-export of
goods imported to the FRG. l l0
Additionally, the Foreign Trade Act regulates specific con-
98. AWG §§ 8-24.
99. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 44. Correspondingly, under the AWV, Chapter
II is on exports; Chapter III on imports; Chapter IV on transit; Chapter V on serv-
ices; Chapter VI on capital transactions; and Chapter VII on payments. The two
statutes must be read together. See id.
100. AWG § 8-14.
101. AWG §§ 15-22.
102. AWG §§ 22-23.
103. AWG § 24.
104. AWG § 7.
105. AWG § 8.
106. Id.; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 44.
107. AWG § 8, $ 1; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 44-45. This provision must be
read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the WIwRSCHAvrssIcHERSTEL-
LUNGSGESETZ ("Act of Safeguarding the Economy"). Id.
108. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 45.
109. Id. at 45. "This purpose has clearly been stated by the respective commit-
tee of parliament dealing with the bill of the AWG." Id.
110. AWG § 8, 3. This section reflects the FRG's responsibilities under inter-
state agreements or under supra national organizations that may prohibit the FRG
from exporting goods that it was permitted to import by agreement. See SIEBEL, supra
note 54, at 45.
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ditions in export agreements.I' For example, if the terms re-
garding the payment and delivery of products to non-residents
are inconsistent with standard trade practices, they can be sub-
ject to regulation." 2 This measure has the power to prevent
unfair trade practices." 13
2. The Authorization Process as a Means to Provide
Exemption from Restriction
The statutory restrictions may require that, when execut-
ing certain transactions, the legal party must obtain general or
specific permits from the appropriate authorities."14 This ad-
ministrative review amounts to a discretionary control. The
governing principles remain, first, the greatest possible free-
dom of international trade, 1 5 and, second, the constitutional
right to equal treatment. 1 6 As the Foreign Trade Act limits
the allowable restrictions on trade," 7 the permits exempting
the applicant from a restriction should be liberally granted." 8
The Foreign Trade Act provides direction to those authorities
that issue exemptions. 119 The authorities grant licenses where
they can expect that the purpose of such restrictive provision
111. AWG § 9. Procedural matters, such as customs declarations, are also regu-
lated. AWG §§ 8-14.
112. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 46. This eventuality occurs when a transac-
tion's terms, set by a resident exporter, undercut usual terms and could or might
result in serious disruption to German exports to the respective importing country.
Id. AWG § 9, 1 allows the prohibitions of the foreign trade law to include an export
agreement with such conditions. Id. The section further provides that the resident
exporter should fix his or her price in a reasonable manner to avoid detrimental
effects. Id.; cf. GATT, supra note 16, art. VI., T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 19, 55 U.N.T.S. at
212.
113. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 46;
114. See AWG § 3. In practice, a set of working appendices, the Ausfuhrliste
("Export List" or "AL") and the Landliste ("Nations List" or "LL"), operate in con-
junction with the restrictions set up in the AWV, establishing which goods have au-
thorization or notification requirements. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 12. For exam-
ple, Part I consists of weapons, munitions and military materials and other distinctive
technologies, including those for constructing chemical and biological materials. See
id.
115. AWG § 1.
116. GG art. 3.
117. AWG § 2, 2; § 3.
118. AWG § 3, 2. The practice of handling such authorities is dealt with in
AWG §§ 3, 28 and 30, as well as in AWV §§ 1-3.
119. AWG § 3. These authorities are mentioned in AWG § 28. Further details
about the contents of authorizations are found in AWG § 30.
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would not or would be endangered only insignificantly by the
execution of such transaction or deal.' 20 Again, great liberty is
involved in issuing licenses. To that end, the respective au-
thorities have additional latitude if the general economic inter-
est in the execution of such transaction or deal outweighs any
impairment to the purpose of the limitation stipulated.' 2' The
authorities may also consider the degree of economic hardship
that a restriction consequently imposes on residents' busi-
nesses.122 Authorizations may be granted conditionally. 23 In
addition, the appropriate authorities may impose time limits or
reserve the right of revocation to assure compliance with any
preconditions. 24 The authorities may revoke fraudulently or
illegally obtained authorizations. 125
The authorization exempting the exporter from restric-
tion may be either specific or general. 26 Logically, the specific
permit is limited to a particular transaction.12 7 A general au-
thorization 12 8 provides for engaging repeatedly in a form of
transaction. 29 General authorizations, however, may be time-
restricted.13 0 In addition, the Foreign Trade Act requires a di-
rect or indirect participant in a foreign economic transaction to
provide certain relevant transactional information to the gov-
ernment'1' to facilitate the enforcement of foreign trade
120. AWG § 3, 1; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 59.
121. AWG § 3, 1; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 59. AWG § 30, 2 provides that
the "authorization, [and the turning down of an application] must be in writing. The
decision must contain the reasons for it, pointing out possible legal remedies in case
it might be contested." AWG § 30, 2, translated in SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 60.
Further, AWG § 30, 1, sent. 2 provides that an authorization is only transferable if
such transferability is expressly provided for in the authorization. Additionally, the
recipient of an authorization may or may not use it. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 60.
122. AWG § 3, 2; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 59.
123. AWG § 3, 2.
124. Id. § 30, 1. "The revocation is only allowed insofar as this is necessary to
safeguard the aims protected by the Law." SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 60.
125. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 60.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. AWV § 2.
129. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 60-61.
130. Id. at 61.
131. AWG § 44, 2. The main body of the reporting obligations are contained
in AWV §§ 9-18. In each case, the duty to report lies with the resident who is party to
the respective transaction, AWV § 58, or the respective resident enterprise, AWV
§ 58b. Claims against or obligations towards non-residents have to be reported to
the Bundesbank on a monthly basis. AWV §§ 62-63; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 63.
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law.' 3 2 The customs officials have the right to inspect and
search exports where duties arise under the Foreign Trade
Act.' 33 The Foreign Trade Act requires that the resident pre-
pare and submit reports for foreign trade transactions. 34 This
duty is, however, limited 35 to ensure the overall liberal aspect
of the foreign trade law.13 6
3. The Penalties under the Foreign Trade Law
The Foreign Trade Act and the Foreign Trade Regulation
contain penalties for their contravention. 3 7  The Foreign
Trade Act, in its apportionment of penalty, differentiates be-
tween minor offenses 3 8 and criminal offenses.' 39 Criminal of-
fenses are punishable with prison terms of up to five years' 40
and considerable fines.' 4 ' Additionally, the Foreign Trade Act
gives customs officials special powers. 42 By including the dis-
132. See SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 63.
133. Id.
134. AWG § 26, $ 2-4. The basic rule on such reports is, however, limited. Id.
"The details are fixed by way of ordinance in accordance with Section 26 AWG al-
lowing to request the submission on 'legal transactions and deals within the scope of
Foreign Economic Transactions, in particular on claims and obligations arising there-
from as well as investments and the making or receiving of payments, indicating their
legal basis.'" SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 62 (quoting AWG § 26).
135. AWG § 26, 2.
136. Id. § 26, 4. "[T]ype and extent of the reporting duties are to be limited
to what is necessary in order to fulfill the specific targets as laid down in [fl 2 and [f]
3." AWG § 26, 4, translated in SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 63.
137. AWG §§ 33-46; AWV § 70.
138. AWG § 33; see AWV § 70 (listing possible minor offenses against the AWV);
SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 64.
139. AWG § 34 (punishing contraventions where legal constructs of AWG § 7
are sufficiently disturbed); see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 65.
140. AWG § 34, 1. Prior to the reform of the AWG, the term was three years,
and legislative attempts were made to increase this term. E.g., BT-DR. 12/289 (intro-
ducing bill providing for five years although ultimately not passed for other political
reasons). The recent reform measures increased the term to five years. See SIEBTES
GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES AWG § 34, 1992 BGBI. I 372 (F.R.G.).
141. AWG §§ 33-34; see Giinther Dahloff, Der neue § 34 AWG, 199-1 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF-r 208, 208. Under the revised AWG § 33, such contraventions
can be punished with fines of up to DM 1,000,000 against the actor as well as the
company for which he worked. In addition, further financial penalty may be levied to
the extent of transactional profit. Id. See GESETZ UBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN
[OWiG] §§ 29a and 17, 4, 1987 BGBI. I 602 (F.R.G.) (as amended by ANDERUNG
DES OWiG, 1992 BGBI. I 375 (F.R.G.)). For a discussion of penalties, see also L6f-
fler, supra note 7, at 122.
142. AWG § 42; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 65.
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tinction in offenses, 4 3 the statutory intention is to induce
proper compliance.' 44 Both of these statutory offenses con-
cern particular contraventions, 4 ' which again are where the
security of the FRG is endangered, where the peaceful coexis-
tence of nations or peoples is disturbed, or where the foreign
relations of the FRG are seriously affected.'
46
4. FRG Legislation Supplementing the Foreign Trade Law
Certain designated exports or categories of exports are
regulated by narrowly constructed export control laws.' 47 The
AtomGesetz ("Atomic Materials Act" or "AtG") 41 governs the
authorization procedures for the export of radioactive materi-
als.' 4 9 The additional regulation effectively doubles the export
review process as a matter of law, requiring compliance sepa-
rately under both the Foreign Trade Act and the Atomic
Materials Act.' 50 Naturally, the handling of uniquely sensitive
materials includes additional safety factors.' 5 ' The Atomic
Materials Act authorization process exclusively serves the
achievement of these particular purposes, as well as related ex-
port policy concerns. 5
2
The export of military weapons is regulated by the Kriegs
waffenKontrollGesetz ("Weapons of War Act" or
"KWKG"). 5 3 The Weapons of War Act, however, is not for-
mally part of foreign trade law.' 5 4 The Weapons of War Act
corresponds to constitutional provisions regarding military
weaponry.' 55 An appendix thereto establishes the relevant
143. AWG § 33, 1. AWG § 34 provides for particularly egregious cases. See
HucKo, supra note 22, at 12.
144. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 11. Statutory contraventions include negli-
gent handling as well as intended contravention under AWG § 33, 6. See Loffler,
supra note 7, at 122.
145. AWG § 33, 1.
146. Id.§ 7; see SIEBEL, supra note 54, at 65; Dahloff, supra note 141, at 208.
147. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 11-14.
148. GESETZ UBER DIE FRIEDLICHE VERWENDUNG DER KERNENERGIE UND DEN
SCHUTZ GEGEN IHRE GEFAHREN (ATOMGESETZ) [AtG], 1959 BGBI. I 814 (F.R.G.).
149. AtG § 3, 1.
150. See id. §§ 3, 22.
151. See id. § 1, 2.
152. See id. § 1.
153. AUSFOHRUNGSGESETZ zu ARTIKEL 26 ABS. 2 DES GRUNDGESETZES (GEsETZ
OBER DIE KoNTROLLE VON KRIEGSWAFFEN) [KWKG], 1961 BGBI. I 444 (F.R.G.).
154. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 14.
155. See KWKG § 1, 1. This law implements the constitutional requirements
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classes or categories of goods falling under the law. Most as-
pects of the weapons trade are regulated, 156 as well as penal-
ized, under the Weapons of War Act.' 57 The Weapons of War
Act establishes distinct requirements for authorization to ex-
port weapons in addition to the Foreign Trade Act.' 58
II. GERMAN EXPORT CONTROLS HAVE FAILED ON A
PRACTICAL LEVEL
A. A Decade of Dangerous Exports to the Third World
Violation or circumvention of German export controls has
contributed to the supplying of volatile regions of the world
with destructive technology.' 59 Developing countries continue
to obtain chemical' 6° and nuclear' 6 ' technology, and the FRG
that "[w]eapons designed for warfare may not be manufactured, transported or mar-
keted except with the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regu-
lated by a federal law." GG art. 26, 2, translated in BAsIc LAW OF THE FRG, supra
note 14, at 24-25.
156. E.g., KWKG § 3, 1-2. The promotion of military weapons requires au-
thorization; pursuant to KWKG § 3, 3, exports are only permissible if the method
of transport has been approved. Also, KWKG § 2 regulates authorization for the
production and introduction of military weapons to any market.
157. Id. § 22, 1, No. 4.
158. See PuTrLER, supra note 21, at 28.
159. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (recounting German transfers of
dangerous technologies to Third World).
160. See Adams, supra note 10, at 38. Chemical weapons goods and technology
continue to proliferate in the Third World.
Twelve developing countries-Burma, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam-are now believed
to have chemical weapons programs. Nineteen other countries-Afghani-
stan, Angola, Argentina, Chad, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, India,
Indonesia, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,
South Africa, South Korea, and Thailand-have been trying to obtain chem-
ical weapons and may have succeeded. The developing countries have in
general had to acquire their chemical weapons capability on their own, usu-
ally illegally but frequently with the complicity of Western companies and
governments who turn a blind eye because they have found a useful source
of export earnings.
Id. For a similar breakdown of developing countries' degree of chemical capabilities,
see Rudolf, supra note 27, at 391.
161. See Adams, supra note 10, at 47. For example, Israel, India, Pakistan, Bra-
zil, and Argentina have refused to ratify the NPT. Id. However, ratification provides
no absolute assurances.
Iraq [an NPT signatory] pursued an aggressive twenty-year program to ob-
tain nuclear weapons, with much Western help, notably from Germany. In-
dia developed a nuclear capability in the early 197 0s and has actually tested
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has been a consistent supplier of this technology. t6 2 For exam-
ple, German business with Pakistan apparently involved the
sale of heavy water and other various resources for construc-
tion of atomic weaponry, t6 3 and a German submarine manu-
facturer provided South Africa with designs for an advanced
submarine, violating a U.N. embargo.'
FRG industry also apparently was involved intimately in
the production of a chemical weapons plant in Rabta, Libya.16 5
For example, in 1985, Imhausen Chemie, one of the German
chemical companies involved, contracted with Libya to design
and produce a chemical weapons plant.166 Imhausen arranged
for the participation of Salzgitter Steel Company, which was
owned by the German government.' 67 Imhausen, however, in-
formed Salzgitter that the work was for a pharmaceutical plant
in Hong Kong.' 68 By 1988, the plant was producing nerve-gas
a nuclear device. Pakistan, after more than fifteen years of trying to develop
nuclear weapons, has either succeeded or is on the brink.
Id. For a similar breakdown of developing countries' nuclear capabilities, see also
Rudolf, supra note 27, at 391.
Additionally, in a meeting with Bundestag member Alfred Dregger, Iranian For-
eign Minister Ali Albar Welajati expressed his country's intention to become a nu-
clear power in order to counter its neighbors' capabilities. Deutsche Hilfeftir Koreas
Bombe, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 4, 1991, at 17.
162. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (recounting German transfers of
dangerous technologies to Third World).
163. See KoPPE & KOCH, supra note 4, at 17-32; see also Mark Hibbs, German Court
Convicts Three for Nuclear Exports to Pakistan, NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 1, 1990, at 5; Mark
Hibbs, German Court Says Officials Encouraged Transfers to Pakistan, NUCLEAR FUEL, Nov.
12, 1990, at 14 (reporting that officials told license applicant to avoid using word
"tritium" to ensure approval).
164. See BT-PR. 11/232, at 18431-54; Hoffmann Alles ohne Kontrolle, supra note 1.
165. See Deckname ZR, DER SPIEGEL, Dec. 23, 1991, at 76 (reporting that FRG
intelligence knew about German involvement in chemical weapons production in
Libya); "Der Hinweis traf ins Schwarze," DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 27, 1990, at 118 (charting
numerous German companies that supplied Rabta plant with chemical weapons
products, plans, and services).
166. See Deckname ZR, supra note 165, at 77. Jiirgen Hippensteil-Imhausen of
Imhausen Chemie later received a five-year sentence for his part in producing a poi-
sonous-gas facility in Libya, but was able to retain his DM 60,100,000 profit. See "Der
Hinweis traf ins Schwarze, " supra note 165, at 116.
167. See "24 Grad nrdlicher Breite," DER SPIEGEL, July 2, 1990, at 64; Deckname
ZR, supra note 165, at 77.
168. See "24 Grad n'rdlicher Breite, " supra note 167. By professional standards,
Salzgitter reportedly should have known that the products were to be used with
highly poisonous materials and, according to reported conversations, the Libyan con-
nection and desert location should have been apparent. See id. at 65.
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casings.' 6 9 Germans also supplied steel for this production. 7 °
British and American intelligence reported that the completed
plant would be capable of producing 22,000 to 84,000 pounds
of nerve agents a day. 17'
The most reliable customer of German exports, however,
has been Iraq. 72 Over the past decade, German firms report-
edly supplied Iraq with the know-how to produce atomic weap-
ons and nerve gas, and to enhance missile capability.7M The
export of these products occurred despite multilateral agree-
ments to the contrary and appropriate export control mecha-
nisms. German companies apparently supplied Iraq with DM
1,000,000,000 worth of goods with potential military applica-
tion. 174
A well-known example of dangerous transfers eluding
German export control is the construction of the Taji complex
in Iraq."7 5 With the assistance of German companies, Iraq
built a heavy industrial complex specially designed and
equipped to handle metal processes from smelting to end-pro-
duction in order to build one of the most modern and compre-
hensive weapons facilities in the world.' 76 Although the Taji
complex had been designed to produce artillery barrels, rocket
casings, and other large scale military metal products, the




172. See LEYENDECKER & RICKELMANN, supra note 4, at 16-17; Schlimmer als die
Pest, DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 6, 1990, at 80 (charting extensive network of nuclear and
chemical transactions between Iraq and FRG).
173. See LEYENDECKER & RICKELMANN, supra note 4, at 16-17.
174. See Donkin et al., supra note 5, at 20; see also THE DEATH LOBBY, supra note
4, at 310. In an expos6 on Iraq's weapons capabilities, one journalist remarks that
Germany's understanding of Iraq's special needs shone through clearly.
The Federal Republic sold [US]$826 million worth of high technology prod-
ucts to Iraq in 1988, more than double the sales of the year before. In 1989,
West German high-tech exports would roar past the [US]$1 billion mark.
The vast majority of these Iraqi purchases were going into known weapons
plants, such as Taji, Badr, Saad 16, the Al Fallujah and Karbala missile
works, and the al-Hillah rocket fuel and explosives plant.
Id.
175. See THE DEATH LOBBY, supra note 4, at 323. Although the transfers would
have been denied to the former Soviet Union under CoCom or MTCR, Iraq was able
to import the relevant military technology. See id. at 208-09.
176. See id.
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"BAW") approved exports by well-known German industrial
concerns for a general metal plant.' 77 Indications show that
Ferrostaal, the lead German contractor, initially knew that the
intended use of its parts was for the production of cannon bar-
rels. 178
A similar evasion of German export control was also evi-
dent in the construction of the Saad 16 Project in Iraq. 79 The
Saad 16 Project was a laboratory complex in which the Iraqis
supposedly developed military missiles, planes, and other mili-
tary wares.'8 0 The German company Gildemeister was the
general contractor for the project, and the most important
German supplier was the company MBB.' 8 ' The BAW issued
export licenses for the Saad 16 Project from 1985 to 1987 for
dual-use goods, since officially the project was run under the
auspices of the University of Mosul.182 In May 1989, when the
plant's character was internationally obvious, the FRG revoked
the licenses to prevent further German participation in the
technologically relevant work.' 83 Indications that smaller Ger-
man companies were participating in an Iraqi project to en-
hance their Russian-made Scud missiles also existed. 184 The
German navigation and launching technology enabled the
177. See id. at 209, 323. "The Germans ... were so easygoing that the Iraqis
dropped all pretense concerning this project and in the license applications they de-
clared that the computers, machine tools, and controllers were to be used 'for gen-
eral military applications such as jet engine repair, rocket cases, etc.' " Id. at 209.
178. See id. "German prosecutors seized 750 cases of documents at Ferrostaal
headquarters, including complete blueprints of the artillery pieces to be manufac-
tured at Taji .... " Id. at 324.
179. See id. at 157-60.
180. See id. at 157-58.
181. See id. at 157-58, 160, 204.
182. See id. at 157-58, 160. In a published work on Western technology assist-
ance to Iraq, one journalist reports that
[t]o disguise the military nature of the project, Gildemeister dressed it up as
a "university research" complex. In documents submitted to export licens-
ing authorities, Gildemeister insisted that Saad 16 comprised "laboratories
and workshops comparable to facilities at universities, technical education
establishments, and testing institutes-that is to say, facilities which are not
specifically built for military purposes." But had any official in the West
German government wanted to know what it was all about, they had only to
ask Gildemeister for a more complete identification of the Iraqi purchaser.
Id. at 157-58 (citation omitted).
183. See id. at 362.
184. See id. at 248-55.
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Iraqis to double the missiles' reach. 185 Other German mechan-
ical refinements facilitated the passage of deadly substances.' 8 6
The German companies probably were not the managers of
the project; instead they were largely involved in individual de-
liveries of technology.' 87 The exports appear to have been
legal under German law. ss
In addition, German companies allegedly were involved in
Iraqi efforts to develop nuclear weapons capability.'8 9 German
participation is evident in the construction and design of cen-
trifuges. 90 The employees of MAN Technologien GmbH of
Munich ("MAN") allegedly played an important role in this
project.' 9' These employees had access to construction plans
of various centrifuge designs.' 92 In 1988 and 1989, after their
departure from MAN, they spent considerable time in Iraq."9 3
The Bundesanwaltschaft ("Federal Attorney") and the
Bundeskriminalamt ("Federal Crime Bureau"), however, were
unable to produce any tangible evidence of an illegal technol-
ogy transfer. 
94
185. See Einefast deutsche Rakete, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 18, 1991, at 44.
186. See id.
187. See THE DEATH LOBBY, supra note 4, at 248-55.
188. See id. at 160. In a comprehensive review of the arming of Iraq, one jour-
nalist reports that
[i]ncredibly, Gildemeister applied for, and received, a blanket permit to ex-
port whatever it desired to Saad 16, with no further licensing requirements.
Building a ballistic missile design and testing technology center was ruled to
be a legitimate business project for German companies, according to the
Federal Economic Agency, which supplied permit number 48422 to
Gildemeister .... [T]he permit state[d] that "according to current rules,
machinery, electrical equipment, regulation, measuring, and testing instru-
ments for a research, development, and training institute with eight main
sections, name: Project Saad 16, do not need an export permission." It was
a license to build Saddam's death machine.
Id. at 160.
189. See Paul Lewis, Iraq Admits Buying German Materials to Make A-Bombs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al. German officials notified U.N. inspectors that prior to
the Persian Gulf war, German companies had sold Iraq parts needed to build up to
10,000 uranium gas centrifuges capable of producing enough highly enriched ura-
nium for use in four to five nuclear weapons per year. Id. at A12. German officials
added that "it was unclear whether [the companies] had knowingly violated German
export controls." Id.; see also Berechtigte Skepsis, DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 13, 1990, at 98.






The firm H&H Metalform, which was half Iraqi-owned,
delivered relevant machinery, including centrifuge parts, and
provided nuclear technology expertise to Iraq.195 The BAW
authorized these exports as the export application stated civil
purposes. 96 The German export officials did not challenge
these statements of purpose. 97 Later, officials' doubts about
the Iraqi customer provoked an investigation.'9 An initial in-
vestigation did not produce any evidence of Foreign Trade Act
violations. 99 U.N. inspectors have confirmed that the applica-
tion of the machinery was indeed military. °°
In January 1984, the U.S. government informed the FRG
that it had reliable information that Iraq bought equipment for
the production of nerve gas from the German firm Kolb °.20  An
investigation revealed that Kolb had business relations with
Iraq since 1979, and also had delivered two so-called experi-
mental facilities made of glass, supposedly for the production
of pesticides. 2  Once more, the examination by the BAW at
that time did not produce any determinable violation of for-
eign trade law requirements by Kolb and its subsidiary Pilot
Plant.2 3
The United States and Israel, however, were convinced
that the firm was participating in the production of poisonous
195. See THE DEATH LOBBY, supra note 4, at 280, 318. In fact, "three spinning
machines purchased from H+H Metalform went into production at Taji. Each one
could turn out one hundred rotors a week. By a conservative estimate, it was enough
to equip three complete production cascades in a year, each capable of enriching
enough uranium for one-and perhaps several-atomic bombs per year." Id. at 280.
Cf. Smith & Fisher, supra note 5; Berechtigte Skepsis, supra note 189, at 99.
196. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 5; Schlimmer als die Pest, supra note 172, at 84.
197. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 5. In reviewing export licenses, customs
officials have given industry the benefit of the doubt where the potential for civilian
use was reported. See Schlimmer a/s die Pest, supra note 172, at 84.
198. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 5.
199. See Berechtigte Skepsis, supra note 189, at 99. Due to subsequent findings, two
owners of H&H Metalform are now being held pending legal action. See Smith &
Fisher, supra note 5.
200. See Berechtigte Skepsis, supra note 189, at 99.
201. See Teures Schweigen; Die Exporteure von Giftgasanlagen an den Irak kommen md'-
licherweise glimpflich davon--dank jahrelanger juristischer Schlampereien im Bonner Kabinett,
DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 23, 1991, at 68 [hereinafter Teures Schweigen]; see also KoPPE &
KocH, supra note 4, at 230-31; Smith & Fisher, supra note 5.
202. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201, at 68-72.
203. See id. German press reports have made clear thiat Kolb and Pilot Plant had
for years delivered poisonous-gas products to Iraq. See Schlimmer als die Pest, supra
note 172, at 84.
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gas for Iraq and requested action by the German govern-
20ment. 04 Thus, the executive branch, the Bundesregierung
("Federal Government"), introduced and successfully lobbied
for passage of additions to the working appendix of the For-
eign Trade Regulation. These additions provided that export-
ing facilities or their parts that are appropriate for the produc-
tion of poisonous gas first must be approved before export. °5
In October 1984, two German chemical experts, sent by
the Federal Government, visited the chemical facility in
Samarra. °6 These experts concluded that the production of
military substances in the facility they visited was improbable
or only possible at great risk.2 °7 Since November 1987, the
State Attorney pursued the firms Kolb and Pilot Plant, as well
as the companies WET and Preussag, for improper export,
based on the suspicion of illegal exports for the Iraqi military
substances program.2 0 8 By the end of 1986, there were suffi-
cient findings to begin criminal proceedings.20 9
B. Recent Reforms of FRG Foreign Trade Law
1. The 1989-1990 Reform: A Response to Rabta
With the increasing public awareness that certain develop-
ing countries were employing German know-how to produce
atomic, biological, and chemical ("ABC") weapons, the Fed-
eral Government took additional legislative steps. After publi-
cation in 1989 of German participation in the production of
poisonous gas in Libya and Iraq, international pressure for
stronger export controls increased. 2 0 As a result, the Federal
Government presented its three definitive bills to the
Bundestag2 1' to strengthen the foundations of foreign trade
204. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201, at 72; see also LEYENDECKER & RICK-
ELMANN, supra note 4, at 28; Schlimmer als die Pest, supra note 172, at 84.
205. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201, at 72.
206. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201; see also "Der Hinweis traf ins Schwayze, "
supra note 165, at 114.
207. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201; see also "Der Hinweis traf ins Schwarze, "
supra note 165, at 114.
208. See Teures Schweigen, supra note 201, at 69, 72.
209. See id.
210. See HuCKo, supra note 22, at 15.
211. BT-DR. 11/4230 (introducing Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurfeines
Fiinften Gesetzes zur Anderung des A WG); BT-DR. 11/4568 (introducing Gesetzentwurf der
Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Anderung des A WG); BT-DR. 11/4609
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and military weapon control laws in order to recognize and
eliminate the effects of German production of ABC weap-
ons.
2 1 2
The revisions focused on forbidding the production and,
therefore, the export of ABC weapons.21 3 Previously, the pro-
duction of ABC weapons was legal.2 4 Although the produc-
tion of these weapons was allowed if authorized, in practice
authorities would not grant such authorization.215 However,
this legal status had presented jurisdictional problems, as Ger-
man companies were involved in ABC production abroad.21 6
Furthermore, only the manufacturers could be charged with
committing these crimes because they were the legal persons
officially lacking authorization for the exports. 7 For example,
the controls did not directly address the engineers and others
necessary to the production processes, and, therefore, these
persons were not punishable under the previous law. 218
Legislators claimed that the control failure was a conse-
quence of these loopholes.219 Commentators, however, have
remarked that controlling only the export of goods or technol-
ogy is insufficient. 22 0 The transfer of knowledge, such as the
dangerous technology in the abstract, i.e., not yet in tangible-
product form, must also be controlled. 22 1
In conjunction therewith, the revised Weapons of War Act
(introducing Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der
Uberwachung des A WG und zum Verbot von Atomwaffen, biologischen und chemischen Waffen);
see Klaus-Peter Ricke, Aktuelle Stand der Novellierung des Aul~enwirtschaftsrechts-voraussich-
tliche Auswirkungen, 66 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR Z6LLE & VERBRAUCHSTEUERN 278, 279 (1990).
A cabinet resolution of February 15, 1989 expressed the will of the Federal Govern-
ment that the intended legislative revisions would be brought through during 1989
and made effective on January 1, 1990. Id. However, these revisions were not made
effective until Summer 1990. See id.
212. See BT-DR. 11/3995 (introducing Bericht der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen
Bundestag fiber eine m'giche Betieligung deutscher Firmen an einer C-Waffen-Produktion in
Libyen).
213. See HucK o, supra note 22, at 15.
214. See id.
215. See id.




220. See BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 6, at
3.
221. See Ricke, supra note 211, at 282.
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prohibits the domestic production of ABC weapons.222 As a
result, the formal authorization process was eliminated. 223
New penal regulations address all participants in the produc-
tion of ABC weapons, including employees of the manufac-
turer.224 The scope of the new penal measures now extends to
German actors abroad.2 25
The amended Foreign Trade Act, revised in 1990 ("1990
Reform"), also included new penal provisions.226 The former
provision was, in practice, rarely applied, because a violation
was nearly impossible to prove. 27 Itrequired evidence of con-
crete injury to the interests of the Foreign Trade Act, which
are the security of the FRG, the peaceful coexistence of peo-
ples, or foreign relations. 22 8  The revision substituted the
lesser standard of showing potential endangerment to these
legal precepts. 229 Thus, it is now sufficient that the act in ques-
tion is potentially dangerous to these legal constructs. 230 The
1990 Reform increased the terms of punishment as well.2 3' As
a further control, the 1990 Reform included, as stated above,
the statutory capacity to restrict the business of Germans
abroad.23 2 Ostensibly, the German government had greater
power to curb the possible use of German assistance in the
production of deadly technology. 33
222. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 15.
223. KWKG §§ 17-18.
224. KWKG § 21.
225. KWKG § 21; cf. Remien, supra note 9, at 446-49. Some commentators,
comparing the measures to those of other Western industrialized countries, claim the
measure is extensive. See HUCKo, supra note 22, at 16.
226. FUNFrES GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES AWG, 1990 BGBI. I 1457 (F.R.G.); see
Dahloff, supra note 141, at 208.
227. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 16. Despite the growing number of discovered
cases-the responsible officers were occupied with 200 cases of illegal exports-only
the rare case met the threshold of the statute. See Dahloff, supra note 141, at 208.
The legal standard did not serve its preventative function. See id. During the period
of 1983-1989, only 20 cases were tried under the AWG resulting in eight convictions.
See STATISTISCHEN BUNDESAMT WIESBADEN, FACHSERIE RECHTSPFLEGE, Reihe 3 (eds.
1983-89).
228. See Dahloff, supra note 141, at 208.
229. AWG § 34; see BT-DR. 11/4230; Dahloff, supra note 141, at 208.
230. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 16.
231. See id.
232. AWG § 7, 3; cf. Remien, supra note 9, at 446-49.
233. See HUCKO, supra note 22, at 16. The Reform brought these powers into
effect practically. See id. Additionally, the AWG reform contained provisions for a
notice requirement that concerns itself with the legal business and trade in ABC
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The 1990 Reform also incorporated administrative
changes. 234 These changes included the introduction of a na-
tionwide database available to customs officials.2 35 The com-
puter system KOBRA ("Kontrollen bei der Ausfuhr" or "Con-
trol of Exports") is now operating in 200 customs offices. The
KOBRA system provides operators with information on ex-
porters, including past authorization applications.236 The pur-
pose of this system is to expose possible or potential offend-
ers.
23 7
Unfortunately, the implementation of the system has ap-
parently met with numerous practical problems and little fed-
eral support.238  The continuing reform ultimately did not
achieve the intended goal. The embarrassing export of dan-
gerous military technology to developing countries contin-
ued.239 In fact, further exports followed in the face of the 1990
U.N. embargo against Iraq.24 ° More recent developments indi-
cate further breaches of export controls. German companies
reportedly have participated in -the nuclear advancement of
weapons. AWG § 26. The BMWi needs to know which companies are involved in





238. See Georg Escher, Germany's Customs Service: A Kobra 's teething troubles causing
illness, headaches, NURNBERGER NACHRICHTEN, reprinted in GERMAN TRIB., Aug. 18,
1991, at 8 (reporting on administrative problems, such as lack of qualified personnel
and coordination of data entry).
239. See Donkin et al., supra note 5, at 20.
240. Id.; see Monterey Institute of International Studies, Emerging Nuclear Suppli-
ers & Proliferation Project, reprinted in Release of Rep. Fortney H. (Pete) Stark, Stop West-
ern Companies From Selling Nuclear Weapons Technology To The Next Saddam, Sept. 13,
1991. Iraq managed to secure willing and able German exporters. German compa-
nies that reportedly sold nuclear weapons technologies to Iraq included employees
of MAN Technologien (centrifuge design); Export-Union, H&H Metalform, and
Leybold (vacuum pumps and valves); Kavo (power supply); Invako and H&H
Metalform (magnetic bearings). Id. These exports occurred despite indications that
the Federal Government was aware of the activity. Poisonous gas materials, for ex-
ample, continued to cross borders, although the secret service and the Federal Gov-
ernment had been warned. See LEYENDECKER & RICKELMANN, supra note 4, at 17.
Although the traditional mechanisms were in place, a sufficient quantity of supplies
and a sufficient quality of information made its way to Iraq. See Kenneth R. Timmer-
man, Surprise! We Gave Hussein the Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at A33 ("More
than 450 Western companies helped build Mr. Hussein's nuclear machine, sending
thousands of technicians into Iraqi weapons facilities on lucrative commercial con-
tracts.").
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North Korea.24 '
2. The 1992 Reform: A Response to Samarra
The Federal Government, in completing its reform of
FRG export controls, introduced and the Bundestag enacted a
variety of new measures in February 1992 (" 1992 Reform"). 42
The 1992 Reform considerably increased penalties and sanc-
tions for violations, added both additional restrictions and en-
forcement means, and strengthened the administrative appara-
tus of export controls.243 The 1992 Reform furthered the
reach of the FRG foreign trade law, as it broadened the
prosecutorial reach to include German technicians abroad ac-
tive in the production of ABC technology. The 1992 Reform
attempted to remove the economic incentive connected to ille-
gal exports by creating the authority to reach all proceeds, and
established a concept of individual accountability for company
procedures 244
In order to prevent illegal exports, the Federal Govern-
ment has taken additional steps to discover and halt these ille-
241. See, e.g., Deutsche Hilfefir Koreas Bombe, supra note 161, at 16-17. According
to an exposed BND report to the Chancellor's office, German companies have also
participated in building atomic weapons for North Korea. Id. North Korea, an NPT
signatory, has refused to allow inspection of its Yongbyon site. David E. Sanger, Data
Raise Fears of Nuclear Moves by North Koreans, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at 1. Intelli-
gence information suggests that ongoing outfitting of the nuclear complex is nearing
completion. Id. The facility reportedly includes a suspected reprocessing plant capa-
ble of producing hundreds of pounds of weapons-grade plutonium. Id. Other indi-
cations suggest other nuclear complexes under construction, even underground,
around the country. Id. North Korea maintains that the reactor is part of a peaceful
research project. Id. The U.S. government fined the Frankfurt-based Degussa A.G.
for re-exporting a shipment of American zirconium, useful in the manufacturing of
uranium fuel rods, to Pyongyang. Id. at 10. The German press charges that in early
1991, the Berlin company Leis Engineering GmbH delivered a specialized steel alloy
capable of containing radioactive materials to Pyongyang; these were reportedly pro-
duced by the Duisburg company VDM Nickel-Technology. Deutsche Hilfe fzr Koreas
Bombe, supra note 161, at 16-17. The purported use of the parts was for a fertilizer
plant. Id. These descriptions were uncontested at the customs site. Id. The BND
reported that other secret service agencies estimated that North Korea would have
enough materials by the mid-nineties to build at least two or three atomic bombs. Id.
242. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 1-2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT
CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 2.
243. See SIEBTES GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES AWG, 1992 BGBI. I 372 (F.R.G.);
BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2-3; BMWx 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra
note 6, at 2.
244. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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gal transfers in a timely fashion.245 Through the revised For-
eign Trade Act, the Zollkriminalinstitut ("Customs Crime Of-
fice") acquired the right, only after the first indications of an
intent to commit an export crime are apparent and upon ap-
proval of the court and under the supervision of the
Bundestag, to invade the basic right to privacy of mail and tele-
phone transmissions.24 6 The Federal Government admits that
such surveillance may trespass upon the classic freedoms that
all Western constitutions recognize.24 7 The Federal Govern-
ment, however, has decided that preventing life- and peace-
threatening exports that are used for weapons of mass destruc-
tion is of greater importance than the individual freedoms in
question. 248 According to the Federal Government, past expe-
rience has shown that the FRG can not efficiently control ex-
ports on the basis of reports from abroad. 49 Rather, the Fed-
eral Government has opted for stronger preventative measures
nationally.25 °
The Federal Government has added additional authoriza-
tion requirements for goods that can be used militarily. 25' The
review process is in effect for machine tools and other types of
machines,252 flat-bed cars suitable for transporting tanks, 53 in-
dustrial units with potential for rocket technology applications
and uranium enrichment, 254 all elements designated by the
245. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWI 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 4.
246. See SIEBTES GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES AWG § 39-41, 1992 BGBI. I 372
(F.R.G.); BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
247. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
248. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWI 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra 6, at 5.
249. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
250. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
251. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2-3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT
CONTROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
252. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
253. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 5.
254. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
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Australia Group as usable in chemical weapons, 55 and civilian
apparatuses capable of being engaged for the production of
chemical or biological weapons. 25 6 Additionally, a catch-all
clause includes all goods under the authorization requirements
when the exporter has knowledge of their impending employ-
ment in weapons production in the receiving country. 7 At
the same time, the Federal Government has compiled a list of
countries to which it will apply stricter controls.2 58 As a result,
the Federal Government hopes that it will produce a warning
effect and efficiently concentrate the review of exports to sensi-
tive locations.2 59
To support administratively the increased legislative con-
trol of exports, the Federal Government intends to reinforce
its corps of civil servants and to improve its computer system
that processes export data.2 60  The FRG intends to nearly
double employment in this area. 26' Further, the 1992 Reform
establishes the legal basis for organizing a federal export of-
fice.2 62 This approach has enabled the Federal Government to
increase and enhance its inspection of exports and exporting
companies.263 The effect of the 1992 Reform on the FRG's
255. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
256. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
257. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 2; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
258. SIEBZEHNTE VERORDNUNG ZUR ANDERUNG DER AWV art. I, 1992 BAnz. 513
(F.R.G.). The countries include Egypt, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mozambique, North Korea, Pakistan,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam, Qatar,
Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia. Id. See RUNDERLAB AUBENWIRTSCHAFr No. 7/92,
1992 BAnz. 514 (F.R.G.).
259. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
260. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6.
261. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6. Prior to the reform, 70 persons were responsible for ap-
proving export licenses upon legal and technical examination. Id. At the beginning
of 1992, that number increased to 228 personnel. Id. The Federal Government ex-
pects to hire an additional 202 employees. Id.
262. See GESETZ UBER DIE ERRICHTUNG EINES BUNDESAUSFUHRAMTES, 1992 BGBI.
I 376 (F.R.G.).
263. See BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3; BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CON-
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ability to control exports remains to be seen.
III. THE PRACTICAL FAILURE OF GERMAN EXPORT
CONTROLS ILLUSTRATES THE DIFFICULTY IN"
REGULATING MODERN TRADE DOMESTICALLY AND
DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR VIGOROUS
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
In the recent past, German export controls have failed to
prevent the export of products usable in dangerous weapons,
as they have not been able to screen adequately those technol-
ogies and goods with deadly potential. A reassessment of the
current legal approach, as well as its implementation, is neces-
sary. The process of developing a scheme of export controls
should include the reworking of existing domestic and interna-
tional controls as well as initiating legal innovations.26 Ac-
cordingly, regulating exports in order to minimize transfers of
dangerous technology should involve a set of clearly defined
national controls that operate within a comprehensive system
of international coordination.265 Increased progress toward
responsible sharing of global power in response to unprece-
dented interdependence and interaction is, arguably, inevita-
ble.266 As purely national controls will not suffice in this con-
TROLS, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that Federal Government enforcement has increased
from 405 inspections in 1989 to 1051 inspections in 1991).
264. Cf. Myres S. McDougal, Law and Peace, in APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTEL-
LECTUAL MAP 131, 154 (W. Scott Thompson & Kenneth M. Jensen eds., 1991). De-
veloping a legal scheme to order international activity requires considering the les-
sons of the past and developing new approaches.
Law is interested in the past and the present in aid of inventing and making
the future. Even in relation to a problem as difficult as that of establishing
and maintaining a stable minimum world public order, the projection of
possible futures, when inspired and disciplined by knowledge of past trends
in achievement and their conditioning factors, may serve to stimulate crea-
tivity in the invention and evaluation of improved alternatives in decision.
Id.
265. Cf. BMWI 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS,-supra note 6, at
10 (calling for international harmonization of export control laws).
266. See McDougal, supra note 264, at 155 (stating that this construct considers
"that the contemporary largely parochial identifications of peoples may, despite re-
current phases of fragmentation, expand toward recognition, not merely of common
humanity, but of shared community"); see also Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. and Russia
Seek New Arms Accordfor aJuly Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at Al (reporting that
United States and Russia reached understanding to cooperate in maintaining defense
system in jointly establishing ballistic missile early-warning system and sharing Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative technology).
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text, a truly centralized legal order should supplement local
efforts.2 67
A. Domestic Regulation of Modern Trade Must Be
Changed Structurally
1. Selective Controls Should Be Eliminated
Modern exports present great challenges to traditional ex-
port control schemes. German legislators have relied on con-
ventional mechanisms to little avail. The present use of discre-
tionary controls has often failed, most notably in the forms of
fraudulent export declarations, dual-use products, and exports
to third countries.2 68  Expending more money and retaining
more qualified personnel probably would not eliminate the
problem as the defect lies more with the character of the dis-
cretionary control. The discretionary controls should be elimi-
nated in favor of express controls imposed nationally with a
flexible framework for revisions to accommodate political and
economic events.
a. Selective Controls Cannot Adequately Control
Dual-Use Goods
Export controls have been particularly vulnerable in the
field of dual-use goods.269 Ultimately, dangerous machines
can be built from non-dangerous substances.27 ° Controls
based on an export's potential for danger ("Selective Con-
trols") are more likely to fail, 27' as technology is increasingly
267. Cf. McDougal, supra note 264, at 156-57 ("The task of highest priority, for all
who are genuinely committed to the goal values of a world public order of human
dignity, would accordingly, appear to be that of creating in the peoples of the world
the perspectives necessary for accelerated movement toward a more effective global constitutive
process of authoritative decision," which would be capable of "more effective decision
process and the making of more rational specific decisions about public order val-
ues.").
268. See Francine S. Kiefer, Bonn to Tighten Export Controls, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, Jan. 29, 1991, at 4; cf. Remien, supra note 9, at 451.
269. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 392-93 (defining "dual-use" products as goods
or technologies with both civilian and military applications).
270. Id. at 392 (stating that "every production technology has potentially civil-
ian and military applications").
271. Cf. Professor Michael Malloy, Remarks at Meeting of the Intergovernmen-
tal Group (Aug. 31, 1990), in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE AGAINST APARTHEID: NOTES
AND DOCUMENTS 48-49 (Apr. 1991) (stating that "effective sanctions almost inevitably
involve broad sanctions").
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less use-specific. 72 For the purposes of Selective Controls, ba-
sic FRG enforcement procedures and resources have been in-
adequate, 73 possibly because the practical ability and the
political will to screen exports on the necessary scale had not
been realized. 74 Insufficient resources and employee negli-
gence at customs sites have been problems. 275  Nonetheless,
consistently accurate determinations under Selective Controls
are impossible. 276 This process amounts to making prophetic
judgments on inherently neutral products. Moreover, the
proper implementation of Selective Controls often depends on
the sophistication in identifying uses of technology.277 Even
low-range technology, however, can be susceptible to multiple
uses, as steel pipes and furnaces, for example, become danger-
ous when misappropriated. T8
Accepting the premise that Selective Controls are not a
desirable means of control, the obvious alternatives are to
deny certain categories of exports completely or allow their
unrestricted flow. These approaches, regardless of desirability
or feasibility, would at least match policy objectives,2 79 whereas
the discriminating control, the Selective Control, irresolutely
272. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 5 (quoting department head of FRG Export
Control Office: "Dual use is a nearly unsolvable problem. A plant's use can always
be changed. The only absolute answer to it is total embargo."); see also John Markoff,
New Curbs on Exports Are Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at D1. The U.S. Defense
Department recommended curbing exports of inexpensive, but powerful, computers
that are readily accessible to American consumers. Id,
273. See Donkin et al., supra note 5, at 20. German trade officials have admitted
that until recently they had no experts capable of interpreting much of the technical
data submitted in export license applications. Id.
274. Cf. BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 6, at
6-7 (providing pre- and post-Reform data on administration of export controls).
275. See Schlimmer als die Pest, supra note 172, at 84.
276. See Ungeahnter Nebeneffekt, DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 16, 1991, at 131. Developing
countries are still able to assemble the knowledge and parts to construct dangerous
hardware. For example, the U.N. investigation of post-war Iraq uncovered atomic
capability. Id.
277. See Bachmaier, supra note 5, at 10. This characteristic often applies to both
lower and higher-end technologies. "Those [responsible] at [German] customs sites
are incapable of telling the difference between harmless machine parts and deadly
nuclear components." Id. (translation by Comment author).
278. See Timmermann, supra note 240.
279. Cf. Resolution of the Federal Government, Politische Grundsdtze dter
Bundesregierung ftir den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Ristungsgiitern, Apr. 28,
1982, reprinted in DOKUMENTATION: RUSTUNGSEXPORT-KoNTROLLPOLITIK DER SPD 16-
17 (Eckhard Fischer & Almut Bauer eds., 1991) (setting forth official policies of FRG
relating to export of military weapons and related goods).
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deploys international trade policy. The misplaced reliance on
Selective Controls has had the convenient effect of circum-
venting the perception of costly or impolitic control measures.
The consequences have been procedural anachronism, 8 °
political delusion among allies, 281 and increased Third World
tension. 82
Where a product is of dual-use character, the only conclu-
sive determination of an intended dangerous application is the
inspection of the product's end-use. Realistically, this inspec-
tion on a continual and encompassing basis is unlikely under a
national system of export controls, as even the available inter-
national systems have had difficulty with end-use inspection.
283
280. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (regarding change in international
political dynamic and outdated approach of export controls in this regard).
281. Cf. Michael Stroud, Europe's Arms Exporters Pursue Own Agenda, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Apr. 2, 1991, at 1 (quoting arms expert at Brookings Institution who proffered
that "[ilt's hard to see that there is going to be much consensus [on multilateral
export controls]" as allies are likely only willing to "preserve their national self-inter-
est").
282. See Adams, supra note 10, at 36-38.
283. See Meisler, Iraq Ends Siege of U.N. Nuclear Arms Inspectors, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1991, at 1. Even in isolated cases the inspection of a product's end-use has
proven burdensome. Sovereignty issues as well as simple cooperation stand as obvi-
ous impediments. For example, the U.S. delegation inspecting post-war Iraq was
held hostage in an instance of global observance. Id. Although the team was eventu-
ally successful in locating imported atomic and chemical weapons and technology,
the degree of pressure is probably not easily duplicated on a practical basis. See id.;
see also John Tagliabue, Iraqi Weapons Had Chemical Warheads, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12,
1991, at A3.
Also, where a consensual apparatus is in place, success is not assured. The
IAEA, observing internationally determined safeguards-and armed with improved in-
specting capability, regularly inspected the nuclear plants in Iraq, an NPT signatory.
Adams, supra note 10, at 47. However, the centrifuge plants and facilities, used to
enrich uranium and manufacture nuclear weapons, were never part of the inspection
tours. Id.
Currently, such inspection regimes are being re-evaluated. Paul Lewis, U.N. 's
Nuclear Inquiry Exposes Treaties' Flaws, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1991, at A1O. The IAEA
director proposed strengthening its procedures, allowing for unilateral inspection by
his agency, even on undeclared sites on NPT members' territories. Id. Others within
the IAEA recognize that "[i]ntrusive inspections make some [NPT signatories] ner-
vous" and may erode "political support." Id. In fact, the Bush Administration an-
nounced in Geneva in the summer of 1991 that it now favors a less intrusive inspec-
tion system than other countries advocate. Id. Apparently, the United States is con-
cerned about protecting military secrets. Id. Many member countries are as well.
North Korea, although an NPT signatory since 1985, has resisted inspection. Id.
For a discussion of possible reasons for the inadequate results of NPT regula-
tions, see Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1033-35 (explaining that difficulties
with NPT may be due to lack of legal commitment of and participation by developed
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Ultimately, in the current complex network of trade and pro-
duction the end-use and the end-user may not be easily dis-
cernible.284 Thus, only an international system that has the au-
thority to track and inspect the use of exports could signifi-
cantly deter dangerous transfers.
b. The Decisive Means of Control Are Categorical and
Complete Controls
The more effective export controls are express con-
trols.285 The explicit prohibition of all exports ("Complete
Controls") or of categories of exports ("Categorical Con-
trols") to certain nations should be somewhat easier to enforce
domestically. Categorical and Complete Controls have the ad-
vantage of greater certainty. The capacity to clearly define
controlled exports logically enhances the ability to do so. 28 6
The Complete Control, which is not commodity- or category-
specific, is a form of economic sanction. 8 7 Similarly, achieve-
ment of policy goals under Categorical and Complete Controls
is also dependent on rigorous national enforcement. How-
ever, the implementation of national controls is still far from
one hundred percent efficient.288
nations in meeting proposed transfer of civilian technology to meet energy needs of
developing nations as nuclear power became unfavorable energy source, and, thus
non-nuclear states had little incentive to adhere to NPT).
284. See Promothee Project, From Interdependence to Interconnection: Networks Re-
shaping Globalization Patterns, PROJECT PROMOTHEE PERSPECTIVES: NETWORLD, Oct.
1989, at 93; see also Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Was Aware the Iraqis Were Buying Technology,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at AI0 (quoting American intelligence report regarding
Iraqi procurement program: "We believe many entities are false end users, passing
the materials acquired from foreign suppliers directly to state enterprises involved in
military projects, including chemical and biological warfare programs.").
285. Cf. MOYER & MABRY, supra note 3, at 144 ("[S]anctions will have the great-
est economic effect if they totally deprive the target country of some [particular]
product, technology, or commodity that is crucial to an economically significant pro-
ject.").
286. See L6ffler, supra note 7, at 125. This approach also allows countries to
provide, on a category basis, humanitarian aid or assistance to its own nationals
abroad in circumstances where such would not impede the policy objectives of the
controls. Id. The FRG has a constitutional duty to protect its nationals despite any
attendant loosening of controls or sanction. Id.
287. Cf. MALLOY, supra note 21, at 7-19 (discussing scope of "economic sanc-
tions").
288. Cf. GARY C. HUFBAUER &JEFFREYJ. SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECON-
SIDERED 79-81 (1985) (stating that by authors' calculations, current approach to sanc-
tions has had 36 percent "success" rate).
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Replacing Selective Controls with Categorical and Com-
plete Controls takes into account the necessarily larger system
within which these controls should operate. Replacing Selec-
tive Controls with Categorical or Complete Controls has deci-
sive effects, one of which is categorically or completely stop-
ping goods and technology at the border.
Regardless of that practicality, thorny policy questions
arise. 28 9 For example, stringent controls may impede techno-
logical competitiveness and, consequently, advancement. 290
This transition also prevents developing countries from ob-
taining the necessary tools to compete effectively in the mod-
ern system of trade.29 1 The international community recog-
nizes the transfer of technology as an important policy goal.2 92
Fostering of Third World development, however, is im-
plicitly at variance with the prevention of dangerous ex-
ports,293 a characterization that is increasingly a product of
289. See, e.g., David A. Wilson, National Security Control of Technological Information,
25 JURIMETRICS J. 109, 129 (1984-85).
290. See Ed Zschau, Export Controls and America's Competitive Challenge, 1 HIGH
TECH. LJ. 1 (1986) (maintaining that overly cautious export controls on high tech-
nology have detrimental economic effects without achieving national security objec-
tives).
291. See, e.g., NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL; THE REPORT OF THE IN-
DEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES UNDER THE CHAIR-
MANSHIP OF WILLY BRANDT 195-96 (1980).
292. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), Draft Interna-
tional Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/
47 (1985) [hereinafter UNCTAD Technology Transfer Code]. One objective of the
UNCTAD Technology Transfer Code is "[t]o facilitate and increase the international
flow of... technology for strengthening the growth of the scientific and technologi-
cal capabilities of all countries, in particular developing countries, so as to increase
their participation in world production and trade." Id. at 3. However, the actual
support for this policy by developed countries has been questionable, which is evi-
denced by the sharp disagreements in approach bracketed throughout the UNCTAD
Technology Transfer Code. No conclusion has been reached in the extended rounds
of drafting and negotiating. Cf. GERALD K. HELLEINER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
DISORDER: ESSAYS IN NoRTH-SoUTH RELATIONS 189-90 (1981) (proposing changes in
developed countries' trade policies to facilitate transfer of technology to developing
countries); NoRTH-SouTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 291, at 10-12, 197-
98 (proposing measures to increase transfer and development of technology neces-
sary to developing countries); Surendra Patel, The Technological Transformation of the
Third World: Main Issues for Action, in UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE:
THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS 124 (Michael Z. Cutajar ed., 1985) (setting forth suggestions
for strengthening technological capacity of Third World).
293. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 392 ("Arms proliferation, especially the develop-
ment of armament industries in the Third World, is inextricably linked with the more
comprehensive process of the diffusion of advanced technologies-and thus of the know-how
1992-1993] GERMAN EXPORT CONTROL
use, rather than design.2 94  The product-bases of survival,
which combat hunger, improve medical capability, and mod-
ernize any industrial activity, can be the same product-bases of
destruction and death. 295 The alternate option of permitting
unrestricted categorical technology-transfers does not seem
politically feasible at present. The need for effective export
controls on the part of industrialized countries outweighs the
desire for unsupervised imports of technology into Third
World countries. Thwarting the unchecked dissemination of
critical technologies represents an important security inter-
est296 as the modern strategic edge may be more a degree of
technological advantage than of sheer number of personnel.
Those in possession of the technology presumably appreciate
this fact, and these concerns should be incorporated into their
promulgation and enforcement of export control laws.
Categorical and Complete Controls are subject to a range
of externalities and supra-border concerns. The success of
these controls, therefore, particularly depends on multilateral
cooperation.2 97 Complete, as well as Categorical, Controls ul-
timately do not achieve their intended effect when trading
needed to develop and manufacture military goods.") (emphasis added); see also
Skandal von Morgen, DER SPIEGEL, July 15, 1991, at 23. The conflict of development
and technology control was evident in a widely publicized trip by the FRG Economics
Minister in the summer of 1991 to encourage business with Iran, a formality which
was the precursor to lucrative new contracts for FRG industry to build factories in the
Middle Eastern country. Id.
294. See Rudolf, supra note 27, at 392-93. The United States has also had
trouble legislating such matters.
[The President's proposed Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative]
greatly increased the number of ... export controls and included criminal
penalties for American citizens who violated the regulations. However,
many of the chemicals on the list are used in making a wide range of prod-
ucts, such as plastics, pharmaceuticals, and fertilizers. Business interests ar-
gued that the initiative unfairly penalized American companies and opened
the door to foreign competitors who did not suffer similar restrictions. For
example, one of the chemicals on the list can be used to remove hair from
hides before tanning, but with some modifications it can also be used to
make nerve gas. Lobbyists argued that by restricting the export of such dual
use chemicals, the United States was unfairly restricting American industry.
Adams, supra note 10, at 38.
295. See Adams, supra note 10, at 47. For example, "[g]enetic engineering holds
both hopeful and terrifying potential for humanity. It offers the real possibility of
reducing famine, infant mortality, and poverty, but it also allows the production of
weapons that could radically alter the nature of war." Id.
296. See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 9, at 35.
297. See MOYER & MABRY, supra note 3, at 158.
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partners do not have similar degrees of control.298
2. Technology in the Abstract May Elude All National
Controls and Should Be Controlled at the
International Level
The advanced transfer mechanisms are not controllable at
national borders.2 9 9 Thus, the nature of modern technology
exports gives greater force to the argument that the existing
scheme of export control is outdated. Additionally, the mere
expansion of national discretionary enforcement and control
may offend democratic sensibilities. Thus, an apportionment
of export control responsibility would control nationally what
is reasonable without unnecessary disruption of citizens' activi-
ties.
As technology use has become ubiquitous, combatting or
monitoring its flow may have more intrusive and invasive con-
sequences. 30 0 The only truly effective national control meas-
298. See id. at 145; Rudolf, supra note 27, at 390 (positing that "tighter national
restrictions on the transfer of goods and technologies to the Third World are only
effective and sustainable in the long run against economic opposition if all suppliers
commit themselves to a common export control policy") (emphasis added).
299. See Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of
Transborder Data Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 985 (1983) (stating that with
combination of satellites and computers, "vast amounts of the world's accumulated
knowledge" can be transferred in microseconds to users around world).
300. See Geza Feketekuty, Dealing with Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round, in
STRATEGIC TRENDS IN SERVICES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE GLOBAL SERVICE ECONOMY
189, 194-95 (Albert Bressand & Kalypso Nicola'idis eds., 1989). The necessary rigor
can easily be a dilemma for a democracy when controlling the invisible, such as trade
in services. Id. These countries are left with the unattractive options of (i) extracting
more information about the people, money, and information crossing the border; or
(ii) control all goods, people, money, and information crossing the border. Id. Ex-
port policy represents serious democratic concerns: "[h]ow deeply should [the gov-
ernment] pry into the affairs of [its] citizens and to what extent should [it] control the
free flow of information, people, and money?" Id. at 195.
For a perspective on a relevant American debate, compare James R. Ferguson,
Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First Amendment Theory, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1981) (refuting any use of intermediate standard of review, in
favor of requiring compelling interest, which is highest form of constitutional speech
protection) with Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information:
First Amendment Issues, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 867 (1985) (stating that "[n]o first
amendment self-governance interest exists in informing foreign nationals").
For further discussion on American civil liberties and the international transfer
of information, see also Mary M. Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas-Striking a
Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1982-83);
John L. Ellicott, Trends in Export Regulation, 38 Bus. LAw. 533, 540-42 (1983); Ruth
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ures might be so cumbersome and invasive as not to merit
their use. In this case, examination of end-use, where possible,
on an international scale is preferable. Otherwise, where the
export itself is use-neutral, evidence of criminal intent might
be necessary to forestall a transfer. National controls of these
exports would, as demonstrated by a recent Bundestag propo-
sal, invite extensive wire-tapping, mail inspection and other
far-reaching investigatory devices on the part of customs per-
sonnel.3 0 ' Furthermore, where the export might be dangerous
technology or information, the means of transfer are less likely
to be tangible. Disturbingly enough, for example, oral ex-
changes with foreigners or transborder facsimiles would rise to
inclusion in such a scheme, as they are potential transfers.30 2
Interception would likely necessitate the most extensive and
intrusive procedures. The requisite methodology, as well as
the inclusive restrictions, would inevitably impinge on speech
and other privacy concerns for any party with the minima of
foreign contacts.30 3
Exports of information, services, education and persons
can have potent impact-an impact equivalent to the tradi-
tional export of military hardware. 3°4 High-technology weap-
ons require advanced knowledge, skilled labor, and the appro-
priate materials. These variables may be collected separately
Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 50
(1982-83); Kenneth Kalivoda, Note, The Export Administration Act's Technical Data Regu-
lations: Do They Violate the First Amendment?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 563 (1981).
301. See BT-DR. 12/104. The Christian Democratic Union, the controlling
political party of the governing coalition, introduced a bill to provide such authority
to the customs officials, independent of the established authority and procedures of
the State Attorney. Id. It provided, in part, that when the customs authorities had
suspicion of a planned contravention of the law, mail could be opened and tele-
phones tapped. See BT-PR. 12/1203-54; see also Klaus Pokatzky, Wanzen gegen Raketen;
Der Gesetzgeber in Aktion: Lauschangrffe wie noch nie, Riistungsgeschtfte wie zuvor, DIE ZErr,
Apr. 5, 1991, at 11.
302. Cf. Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(b) (1992) (regulating
export of technical data and including oral exchanges of information as means of
export).
303. Cf. Feketekuty, supra note 300, at 194-95 (expressing democratic concerns
in regulating "invisible" trade).
304. See, e.g., BT-DR. 12/2350, at 3 ("Nach allen Erfahrungen ist der Export von
'K6pfen' nicht weniger gefAhrlich als der von Guitern und Technologien."); Un-
geahnter Nebenefekt, supra note 276, at 134 (reporting that FRG company in Bergisch
Gladbach trained 22 Iraqi engineers and technicians in nuclear technology).
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and assembled in other countries. 3°5  Advanced knowledge,
the key element, does not lend itself to convenient national
control.30 6
A comprehensive set of international controls is necessary
to regulate exports that evade national border control. Selec-
tive Controls cannot profess to monitor the flow of abstrac-
tions at physical check-points.307 As a result, the web of na-
tional export controls and legislation quickly becomes pene-
trable °.3 0  Furthermore, presently there is little comprehensive
national or international control over transnational corpora-
tions, which are the chief movers of data, goods, skills, and
other technologies.0 9 The filters at the borders are not pre-
pared to deal with the problem.3 10  Because the modern mani-
festations of technology are no longer limited to concrete
mechanical forms that cross physical borders,3 1' an interna-
305. See Feketekuty, supra note 300, at 194-95.
306. See Das Recht auf die Bombe, supra note 5, at 26. This characteristic has frus-
trated controllers. The BND, in an analysis reported in the German press, concluded
that it would be realistically impossible to stop Iran's nuclear technology program, as
the know-how transfer is impossible to prevent. Id.; see Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. to
Offer Plan to Keep Scientists at Work in Russia; Fears on Weapons; Project's Aim is to Keep
Nuclear Experts from Selling Knowledge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1992, at 1 (reporting that
U.S. aim is to keep nuclear experts from selling knowledge of "really secret" infor-
mation and nuclear bomb technology and "information of paramount importance in
sophisticated technologies" to "hostile countries").
307. Moreover, the continued reign of the national border model of Selective
Controls seems to be especially inappropriate given the extra-terrestrial dimension
to commerce. See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Schrogl, "Space Benefits "-A New Aspect of Global Poli-
tics, 42 AUSSENPOLITIK 373 (Eng. ed. 1991).
308. See, e.g., Branscomb, supra note 299, at 986 ("Technological advances in
transnational communications greatly enhance the ability of users to pursue both el-
eemosynary and criminal purposes.") (emphasis added).
309. See Peter Hansen & Victoria Aranda, An Emerging International Framework for
Transnational Corporations, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 881 (1990-91) (describing efforts
that are being made to address these control deficits).
310. See Branscomb, supra note 299, at 987 ("The coupling of computers with
advanced communications systems can merge voice, image, text, and symbols to
render obsolete the customary legal distinctions ... used to govern the delivery of informa-
tion .... ) (emphasis added).
311. Cf. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(4) (1988). The
Export Administration Act defines the term "technology" as
the information and know-how (whether in tangible form, such as models,
prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or manuals, or in in-
tangible form, such as training or technical services) that can be used to
design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct goods, including com-
puter software and technical data, but not the goods themselves.
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tional network of surveillance is an appropriate addition.
B. Vigorous International Coordination of Export Control Is in Order
An expansive approach to international export control is
necessary for the successful implementation of Categorical and
Complete Controls. A global actor with the standing of an in-
vigorated United Nations should govern the enforcement of
Categorical and Complete Controls. The current international
approach does not adequately deal with the prevailing eco-
nomic and political reality, as seen by the difficulties exper-
ienced by the FRG.3 12 The underlying premise of conven-
tional trade alliances may no longer be valid.31 3 According to
current arguments, the reliance on the aforementioned tradi-
tional suppliers' cartels should be limited.3 4 The newly indus-
trialized countries have gained high-technology expertise that
was once the singular domain of Western industrialized na-
tions.31 5 Furthermore, to avoid the difficult extra-territorial
application of national export controls,3 1 6 a supplemental co-
ordinated international system of control is preferable. An in-
clusive multilateral consensus to determine what categories or
levels of technologies may be exported to the developing
world should ideally effect policy objectives. However, even
these arrangements must be reconciled with overall North-
South relations. Western industrialized countries, members of
a much larger international community, must decide whether
or not, and on what scale, to support development in these
312. See Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 994 ("[T]he structural inadequacy
of the world's usual political and legal institutions for dealing with issues of [prolifer-
ation of dangerous technologies in the developing world and the security threat of
the development needs of this population] ... confounds traditional efforts to create
solutions through ordinary treaties or other international arrangements.").
313. See Lewis, supra note 283, at 10 (quoting chemical and biological weapons
expert at Brookings Institution in Washington).
314. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 283. Large multinational corporations have facil-
itated the transfer of technology, capital and skills from the developed countries to
the newly industrialized countries. See SIMA LIEBERMANN, THE ECONOMIC AND POLrr-
ICAL ROOTS OF THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 129 (1988); see also David E. Sanger, Overtures
to Asia Pose Risk for U.S. Aerospace Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at DI (reporting
possible sale of large stake in McDonnell Douglas Corporation to consortium of
Asian companies which would effectively transfer know-how of American high-tech-
nology industry).
315. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 283.
316. See, e.g., Remien, supra note 9, at 433 nn.2-3, 454.
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regions. In an inclusive international approach, industrialized
nations could align their stated policies with a more realistic
system of national export controls.
1. Reevaluating Traditional International Export Regimes
The current approach to international export control may
be a useful deterrent, but ultimately foreign policy ends will be
met only through extensive multilateral cooperation. Econom-
ically, there is little incentive to enforce strictly export controls
nationally, absent a new international cooperation.3 7 The the-
oretical underlying motivation for limiting certain exports to
certain countries is moral and political responsibility.' 18 The
coordinated implementation of current multilateral controls, it
seems, centers on a subscription to the belief that the practices
of certain countries are inherently dangerous, 319 or that the
modern weapons of war should be vested only in developed
countries.3 2 ° Its predicate is the belief that there is some com-
mon culture of interest in countries with high-technology ca-
pacity.3 2' The reality is that modern interests are increasingly
317.' For a discussion of the economic costs of export controls to domestic in-
dustry, see MOYER & MABRY, supra note 3, at 149-56.
318. Cf. William Nelson, Introduction: Moral Principles and Theory, in POLITICAL
REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL MORALITY: ETHICS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 2 (Kenneth
Kipnis & Diana T. Meyer eds., 1987) ("The scale of the problems, the sophisticated
technology, and the role of institutional structures and cultural and ideological con-
flict make common moral categories somehow irrelevant.").
319. Cf. NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 291, at 10-15 (ex-
pressing need for thorough rethinking to create new type of relationship that could
accommodate all nations in single community).
320. Cf. U.S. Nuclear Technology Tactics Vex Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at A9.
Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani criticized the U.S. government's "utter inso-
lence" in declaring "that Iran does not have the right to utilize nuclear technology
even for non-military purposes." Id. Rafsanjani raised the political argument that
"preserving [his country's] independence and survival in this unsuitable international
climate is not possible without science, technology and the necessary tools." Id.; Dos
Recht auf die Bombe, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Iranian Vice President Ayatollah
Mohadscherami who justified Islamic world's right to nuclear military programs in
light of suspected Israeli nuclear capabilities).
321. Cf. MARGARET P. DoXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL EN-
FORCEMENT 81 (2d ed. 1980). Considering the role of international interaction and
cooperation in relation to interests, one commentator notes that
[a] system of international enforcement might function successfully in a gen-
uinely international community with a cohesive social base where deviations
from norms of accepted conduct were the exception rather than the rule.
The weaker the system and the greater the diversity of values it contains, the
more likely are doubts, hesitations and evasions.
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less ideological and more economic.3 22 Recent world events
have debunked the contention that those possessing like-tech-
nologies have similar interests retaining such. Competing eco-
nomic interests now dominate political alignment.323 More-
over, the number of possessors of critical technologies has in-
creased dramatically. 24 This amounts to a diffusion of
economic and technological needs.32 The geopolitical scene
is now dominated by a multi-polar trading dynamic rather than
a single static ideological divide.32 6 In addition, the traditional
national borders are obfuscated by transnational operations,3 27
and technology is unlikely to have a distinct nationality.328 Its
possession is no longer intimate, but widespread and public.3 2 9
ld.
322. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aides Worry About Spread of Arms From Sales by the Soviets,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at 5. For example, the former Soviet Union's need for
hard currency prompted it to open a virtual arms bazaar to the international buying
public. Id. The Soviet sales drive included rocket engines, space stations, nuclear
reactors and other parts of their space program much of which rivals or surpasses
Western technology. Id. Additionally, some feared that economic incentive would
lure many undercompensated or unemployed Soviet scientists and technicians to mil-
itary programs in developing countries. Id.
323. Cf. Klaus W. Grewlich, The Technology Race, 42 AUSSENPOLITIK 383, 387
(Eng. ed. 1991). Noting the highly charged and competitive role of technology in the
international arena, one author remarks that
[t]he vocabulary in the global discussion on high'technology has assumed a
distinctly military character. There is talk of strategy, alliances, the deploy-
ment of rivals, defence, holding action and attack, pincer movements, with-
drawal positions and reserves. This belligerent language suggest [sic] that
the competition which takes place on this basis could have an adverse effect
on the quality of political relations.
Id.
324. Cf. FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 9, at 56-59 (addressing "steady
diffusion of scientific knowledge, technical and engineering talent, and manufactur-
ing ability in all areas of proliferation").
325. Cf. Grewlich, supra note 323, at 387 (defining relevant developments as
transition to "global and interdependent world, in which power blocs become in-
creasingly irrelevant").
326. Cf. FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 9, at 40-43.
327. See Promothee Project, supra note 284, at 93-113.
328. See id. at 98-100; cf. Elaine Sciolino & Dean Baquet, An American Front Com-
pany Was Cog in Baghdad's Buildup, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, at 1 (reporting that Iraq
set up complex network of corporations internationally for specific purposes of ille-
gally acquiring critical weapons technology in industrialized nations and charting
Ohio company's connection to multilayered corporate structure).
329. FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 9, at 40-42. The various ways in
which this development has unfolded in the international trade arena include (i) the
changing structure of the global economy; (ii) the increasingly rapid global diffusion
of technology; (iii) growing technological and manufacturing sophistication in the
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Containment is made yet more difficult by the inevitable differ-
ences in interpretation among the trade consortia.3 °
The West's worst fears, however, often have been con-
firmed.3 3' Political instability and recurring acts of violence
encourage Western mistrust of dangerous technology in the
possession of developing countries, 3 2 and the need for con-
trol becomes ostensibly greater. The FRG demonstrates this
desperate tinkering and helpless reliance on bureaucratic
cures. However, the implementation of minor national proce-
dural obstacles possibly may be a device simply to make the
inevitable course more tortuous. By making the acquisition of
high technology considerably more expensive and somewhat
more burdensome, developed countries may hope to keep a
degree of advantage. 3 3 A more effective approach, however,
newly industrialized countries; (iv) changing distribution of global economic and fi-
nancial power; and (v) the growing importance of exports to economic vitality. Id.
330. Cf. John Markoff, Soviet Fiber-Optic Deal Challenges U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1991, at D2 (reporting that Germany sold high-speed fiber-optic cable to
former Soviet Union despite contrary CoCom regulation, as there are "different in-
terpretations of the complex issues").
331. See, e.g., Arms Trade Booming, EcONOMiST, June 20th-26th, 1992, at 34 (re-
porting that Third World countries are increasing spending on arms imports); Ed-
ward A. Gargan, 12 Are Killed as Pakistani Police Fire on Kashmiris Marching Toward Bor-
der, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at A3 (reporting that Pakistan, alarmed over possibil-
ity of conflict with India, violently halted march by Kashmiri separatists); Edward A.
Gargan, Diplomats Are Edgy as India Stubbornly Build Its Nuclear Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1992, at AI3; Paul Lewis, Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1992, at 5 (reporting that Pakistan Foreign Ministry official issued first formal ac-
knowledgment of its capacity for making atomic bombs and stated impossibility of
dismantling of program with presence of Indian nuclear program and that both
countries have refused to sign NPT and open installations to international monitor-
ing); Eric Schmitt, North Korea Ship Delivers to Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at A12
(reporting delivery by vessel thought by United States to be carrying missiles).
332. See Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 993, 995-1005; cf. FINDING COMMON
GROUND, supra note 9, at 40 ("Many of these problems [involving regional violence]
are driven or exacerbated by the proliferation of advanced munitions and dual use
technologies related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and to military de-
livery systems.").
333. Cf. Rudolf, supra note 27, at 393. Current export controls may limit to
some degree undesired exports.
As a rule, export controls can increase the difficulties and costs of weapon
projects and slow down their progress. At the same time, they serve as an
early warning, since illegal exports and other practices are a major indica-
tion of the interest of certain states in acquiring arms. Export controls can
also contribute towards regional arms control insofar as they help delay
destabilising developments in this field.
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would involve the FRG in an international system sharing re-
sponsibility for control and enforcement, which would be bet-
ter able to comprehensively implement export policies.3 3 4 An
inclusive, coordinated approach would not have the same tem-
porary and limited effects.
2. Developing an Inclusive Approach to Expanded
Multilateral Cooperation in Controlling Exports
There is a need for a global coordinating actor with the
power to make and enforce laws concerning export control.3 35
This structural approach ties into the informal and disparate
growing interaction and interdependence among nations.3 36
The international economic environment is advancing in this
direction,3 3 7 and remedial construction of a parallel political
structure to govern the dangerous exports within it is in or-
der.338 Achieving a mutually beneficial and, thus, a workable
balance3 3 9 should involve the trade-off of the international
control of technology, that would deny certain countries the
dangerous combinations of technology that endanger world
peace, while promoting and supervising distinctly civilian tech-
334. Cf. BMWi 1992 REPORT ON REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 6, at
9 (stating that necessary efficiency of FRG export controls depends on intensive in-
ternational cooperation).
335. Cf. Yoshikazu Sakamoto, Toward Global Identity, in ON THE CREATION OF A
JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990'S 189, 193 (Saul H. Men-
dlovitz ed., 1975); Schachter, supra note 11, at 71 ("Law must.., be accorded its own
relative sphere of autonomy," although currently "[i]nternational law falls short of
ensuring such autonomy" as the "application of law is left in large measure to the
states concerned and, to some degree, the reactions of the larger community of
states."); Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1013 (calling attention to need for
stronger international legal institutions in context of arms control).
336. Cf. Sakamoto, supra note 335, at 194 (postulating that "organizational lag"
is due to delay in formulating "new system of identification").
337. Cf. id. at 199. "The classic notion of the nation-state and national sover-
eignty is based on the presupposition or myth that the scope of the national state
coincides with the scope of the national economy and national culture . . . [b]ut [the
emergence and importance of the multinational corporation] indicates that the scope
of economy has already surpassed, and will increasingly surpass, national bounda-
ries." Id.
338. Cf. McDougal, supra note 264, at 136 (stating that "disparity between the
demands of the peoples of the world and [the] responding community achievement
• .. constitutes the most general problem in shaping a global legal process designed
better to secure peace").
339. Cf. Schachter, supra note 11, at 68 ("Law, inescapably, is part of the
broader political process ... [a]lthough it sets normative limits, those limits are de-
termined by political goals and they are applied in political contexts.").
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nologies that assist these same nations with basic technical and
welfare needs.34 °
As a matter of principle, reform of the present interna-
tional coordination rests on the theories of normative conver-
gence and dependency.3 4' The challenge to true multilateral
cooperation is to mobilize consensus.3 42 First, normative con-
vergence involves the recognition of interaction among
groups.343 A key element of this concept is encouraging com-
promise. 44 Compromise is naturally crucial to the global ac-
ceptance of a structure that governs the control of exports, as
national sovereignty and economic identity and well-being are
at issue.345 The structural ideal would attempt to simplify an
otherwise complex, diverse, and interdependent set of rela-
tionships.3 46 Coordinating Western and Third World coun-
340. Cf. id. at 52-53; Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1026-42 (proposing
trade-off of disarmament for development assistance).
341. Cf. Ali A. Mazrui, The Search for Human Consensus, in ON THE CREATION OF A
JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990's 1, 3 (Saul H. Mendlovitz
ed., 1975).
342. Cf. id.; McDougal, supra note 264, at 152 ("As the network or interaction
and the perception of interdependence expand, more and more peoples may come to
perceive that the assertion of special interest, against common interest, is not com-
patible with survival.").
343. Cf. Mazrui, supra note 341, at 7; McDougal, supra note 264, at 152. One
scholar notes that
[t]he greatest contemporary failure in realism is in the lack of appreciation
of the comprehensiveness and depth of the interdependences ... of all peo-
ples everywhere with regard to the shaping and sharing of all values ....
Fortunately, the spread of new techniques of communication and modem
education make it possible for individuals everywhere to acquire a new real-
ism about the conditions, not merely of continued existence, but of im-
proved public order.
Id.
344. Cf. Mazrui, supra note 341, at 7.
345. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Won Its Point on U.N. Inspectors, Top U.S.
Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at AI (reporting that although Persian Gulf war
cease-fire terms accorded U.N. inspectors quick and unimpeded access to Iraqi instal-
lations, accord had to be reached on inspection of the Agriculture Ministry in Bagh-
dad as Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz announced that international inspectors
could no longer enter buildings on their own terms); Paul Lewis, U.N. Aide Quits Iraq
After Failing to Gain Access for Arms Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1992, at A3 ("Iraq sent
a senior United Nations envoy away empty-handed today, citing sovereignty and se-
curity as reasons for its latest refusal to allow United Nations arms inspectors into its
Agriculture Ministry."); cf. Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1016 ("[Fluture arms
control accords inexorably will expose many more hitherto private details about the
parties' defense structures, military-industrial capacity, and private businesses.").
346. Cf. Mazrui, supra note 341, at 7 (setting forth stages in coordination and
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tries requires the recognition of the current political, eco-
nomic, and technological imbalances. 347 A meaningful work-
ing relationship will need to be conditioned upon an assertive
policy of inclusion,348 coupled with the promotion of individ-
ual accountability by the means of comprehensive enforcement
and adjudication procedures. 349 The issues in question en-
compass the institutional structure of international economic
relationships, and, therefore, solutions cannot be founded on
any single domestic regimen of economic policy. 350
Although participation in such a model demands the relin-
quishment of a standard sovereign exercise, the regrouping
may assist in minimizing extreme inequities and allow lesser
industrialized countries to focus on more nationally relevant
convergence of world cultures); McDougal, supra note 237, at 134 ("The law relevant
to peace cannot be confined to the coordination of the activities of nation-states ...
[an appropriate law extends, must be extended, to the whole global process of au-
thoritative decision that guides and regulates human activities across nation-state
boundaries.").
347. Cf. Koplow & Schrag, supra note 17, at 1008-12 (explaining that addressing
need for development assistance to Third World is essential to formulating arms con-
trol arrangement); Mazrui, supra note 341, at 18; Schachter, supra note 11, at 71
("[T]he proclaimed ideal of equality of the states under law is substantially qualified
by the actual disparities in power[, but] ... powerful states have a stake in maintain-
ing a system that gives a necessary measure of stability to the existing order.").
348. Cf. Mazrui, supra note 341, at 19. In calling attention to structures of de-
pendency, Mazrui states that a "major stumbling block in the way of Third World assertive-
ness is the absence of the political willfor change. The absence of that political will is substantially
attributable to normative and cultural conditioning." Id.
349. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, U.S.-North Korea Talks Planned on State of Nuclear
Development, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 15, 1992, at A12 (reporting that North Korea, although
an NPT signatory, was able to develop a nuclear weapons program as, according to
expert testimony before Congress, it was questionable "whether the overstretched,
underfinanced [IAEA] could be counted on to detect a weapons program in one of
the world's most secretive countries"); Seth Faison, Baghdad Agrees to U.N. Inspections;
Long Impasse Ends, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1992, at AI (reporting that after threats of
military action by United States and its allies, Iraq agreed to allow U.N. inspectors
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technology needs. 35 ' The proposed model provides advan-
tages of greater security to developed nations and increased
aid to developing nations. In addition, remaining outside of
the internationally controlled network of trade may be eco-
nomically unfeasible and, therefore, encourage participation
and compliance. Setting global standards and enforcement
mechanisms for the interconnected network of trade can bring
the necessary pressure for more control over dangerous trans-
fers.3 52
CONCLUSION
National Selective Controls are an imperfect science, and
the promises of their significance are deceptive. The present
means of transferring dangerous technology are not quite so
easily reduced and require greater international surveillance
and enforcement. National Categorical Controls coupled with
an international coordination of responsibility would best ef-
fect the collective interest in a stable, peaceful, and inclusive
world order.
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